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ABSTRACT
Social insurance programs exist in the United States to help workers maintain
their standard of living across different states of the world. Examples include un-
employment insurance, which aids workers through the state of being unemployed,
and Social Security, which supports workers through the state of retirement. The
three essays in this dissertation study how these types of social insurance programs
alter the decisions workers make in the labor market. The first and third essays fo-
cus on unemployment insurance, where the first essay focuses on how different types
of workers make decisions in the presence of unemployment insurance and the third
essay studies how all workers respond to changes in the provision of unemployment
insurance. The second essay examines how Social Security retirement income influ-
ences the decision of late-career workers to participate in the labor market. All three
essays emphasize that the willingness of workers to pursue a job in the labor market
relies upon the social insurance available to them outside of employment.
Theoretical models of optimal unemployment insurance predict that the job search
and savings behavior of unemployed workers will partially be determined by how
long a worker expects to remain unemployed. Empirical evidence suggests, however,
that workers often underestimate the duration of their unemployment spell. These
biased beliefs about the duration of unemployment among unemployed workers should
therefore affect their job search and savings behavior. To date, no reliable data have
been used to empirically analyze to what degree biased beliefs would change the
behavior of unemployment workers. In the first essay, titled Biased Beliefs and
Job Search: Implications for Optimal Unemployment Insurance, I use a
novel dataset, the Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey, to evaluate how
biased beliefs vary across unemployed workers and how they influence the behavior
of those workers. I find that overly-optimistic unemployed workers underestimate the
duration of their unemployment, leading them to spend 26 percent less time searching
for a job each week than those with a pessimistic bias. I also find that overly-
optimistic unemployed workers have over $8,500 less saved at any given point during
an unemployment spell. These results suggest that unemployed workers with an
optimistic bias would benefit from an information “nudge" that encourages increased
search effort and could lead to faster reemployment.
The first essay demonstrates how workers respond to the presence of social insur-
ance when they are still focused on rejoining the labor market. That is, it provides
evidence on the intensive margin. However, it does not say anything about how it
would influence a worker’s desire to participate in the labor market at all, on the
extensive margin. In the second essay, Do Late-Career Wages Boost Social
Security More for Women than Men?, Matthew Rutledge and I estimate the
incentives for older workers to continue working during their retirement-age years
when they could be collecting Social Security. Any worker who delays claiming Social
Security receives a larger monthly benefit because of the actuarial adjustment. Some
claimants - particularly women, who are more likely to take time out of the labor force
early in their careers - can further increase their benefits if the extra years of work
raise their career average earnings by displacing lower-earning years. This essay uses
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to earnings records to quantify the
impact of women’s late-career earnings on Social Security benefits relative to men’s.
The essay finds that the average gain in Social Security retirement benefits from
working one additional year raises women’s monthly benefits by 8.6 percent, of which
1.6 percent is from late-career earnings. These results suggest that, especially among
women, there are additional benefits to delaying claiming and further increasing the
retirement age.
Through both of the first two chapters, the parameters outlining the social insur-
ance program were held constant. In reality, the rules of a social insurance program
can change over time. Motivated by this possibility, my third chapter, The Impact
of Unemployment Insurance Extensions on Worker Job-Search Behavior,
explores how reservation wages and job search effort respond to extensions of unem-
ployment insurance. Current economic theory predicts that reservation wages should
rise following an extension of potential benefit duration, while search effort should fall.
Previous papers in this literature focus on the end result, which is that UI extensions
result in prolonged unemployment spells. Using the Survey of Unemployed Workers
in New Jersey, and the UI benefit extension in the United States in November 2009,
this paper identifies the worker behaviors that lead to prolonged unemployment dura-
tions. Employing hypothesis testing and event study analysis, this study shows there
are lagged, significant increases in reservation wages and decreases in search effort
following the benefit extension. The results suggest that an alternative model of job
search is needed.
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CHAPTER 1
BIASED BELIEFS AND JOB SEARCH: IMPLICATIONS FOR
OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Theoretical models of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) often rely on rational
unemployed workers to accurately predict the length of time they will remain job-
less. This prediction influences their savings, consumption and job search behavior
leading up to and through an unemployment spell. In reality, unemployed workers
have been shown to systematically underestimate the length of their unemployment.
Spinnewijn (2015) incorporates this systematic error into a model of optimal unem-
ployment insurance and derives implications for how it would influence the behavior of
unemployed workers. In particular, Spinnewijn shows that unemployed workers who
underestimate the length of their unemployment spell will save less and unemployed
workers who overestimate their influence over the length of their unemployment spell
will spend more time searching for a job. This paper examines whether these the-
oretical predictions are empirically true and, if so, what the government can do to
correct such suboptimal behavior.
Price et al. (2004) show that in a survey of unemployed workers and their spouses,
a large portion of the unemployed have an optimistic bias. They find that the actual
duration of unemployment is significantly longer than expected for most of their
sample, implying that job seekers are overconfident about their chances of finding a
job. In particular, the average person took 16 weeks longer than expected to find a
job. These results suggest that not only is this optimism widespread, it is quite large.
If it is true that this bias warps the decision-making of unemployed workers, social
and individual welfare may be improved through adjustments to the UI system.
To evaluate whether unemployed workers with an optimistic bias alter their behav-
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ior compared to unbiased workers, data is needed on job search activity and household
finances, both of which are not included in the survey collected by Price et al. (2004).
I can overcome this limitation using the 2009-2010 Survey of Unemployed Workers
in New Jersey (SUWNJ). This data set contains rich information which can be used
to test the prediction that biased and unbiased unemployed workers behave differ-
ently. Given the richness of the data, I can also determine among which groups of
individuals the bias is most prevalent.
In the first part of the paper, I measure the degree of biased beliefs using the
SUWNJ. Measurement is complicated by the absence of information about the length
of unemployment duration for the majority of survey respondents. I introduce a new
technique into the literature on UI, estimating a discrete-time hazard model to de-
termine the job-finding rates for survey respondents. Combining this analysis with
subjective survey questions gives me two measures of bias, one about the perceived
probability that a job seeker finds employment and a second about how much seekers
believe they can influence their probability of finding employment. While the former
has previously been measured in Price et al. (2004), I am the first to estimate the
latter. I find that among the unemployed in New Jersey, the average job seekers
needed 26 more weeks than expected to find a job. This level of optimism is signifi-
cantly larger than what was observed in previous data, which is likely due to the time
period during which the New Jersey survey was conducted, and is most prevalent
among younger workers at low unemployment durations.
I use these measures of bias to see if people with biased beliefs behave as predicted
by the theoretical model of Spinnewijn (2015). The model predicts that job seekers
who are overconfident about the probability they will find employment save less for
unemployment, while job seekers who are overconfident about their influence over their
job finding probability will search harder. My results show the savings prediction is
true. Unemployed workers with an optimistic bias have an average of $8,400 less in
savings remaining compared to their unbiased counterparts. However, the prediction
about search effort is not supported in the data. Rather, I find that overconfidence
in the ability to influence job-finding probabilities leads to four fewer hours of job
2
search each week.
Compared to the existing literature, this paper makes three clear contributions.
First, it employs a novel dataset in the optimal unemployment insurance literature.
The SUWNJ contains a new set of rich information related to the subjective beliefs
of unemployed workers. Second, it is the first paper to apply a discrete-time hazard
model in the estimation of unemployment hazard rates. Given the censored nature of
most non-administrative unemployment data, this is a useful tool for future research.
Finally, this is currently the only paper to empirically estimate how the presence of
optimism among unemployed workers influences their decision-making. The estima-
tion results imply that policymakers could “nudge" unemployed workers towards the
socially optimal outcome by promoting more precautionary savings, slower savings
depletion, and more job search effort.
The remainder of the paper proceeds with a review of the literature in Section
1. A framework for how the biases may be related to the behavior of unemployed
workers is provided in Section 2, followed by an outline of the data available in the
SUWNJ in Section 3. Given some data limitations in the survey, Section 4 describes
how the true and perceived job prospects are measured and provides estimates for
those measures. The biases among unemployed workers are also presented in that
section. Results from the empirical specification follow in Section 5. The final section
discusses future extensions.
1 Literature Review
While there is some empirical evidence showing the effects of the UI program on
search effort, precautionary saving, and reservation wages, this study is the first to
examine those effects when agents have biased beliefs. As a result, this paper combines
several strands of literature. First and foremost, psychology and economics have a
long history of work studying systematic biases in risk perceptions and have found
broad evidence of overconfidence. This empirical work is summarized in Moore and
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Healy (2008) and has been modeled theoretically by a number of authors.1 Behavioral
economics has adopted some of this work to study how these biases distort behavior,
as well as how we can learn agents’ true preferences from this distorted behavior
Koszegi and Rabin (2007, 2008). In the context of unemployment, Paserman (2008)
uses hyperbolic discounting and DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) use impatience to
analyze policy interventions. However, the most clear connection is to the theoretical
work of Spinnewijn (2015) and empirical work of Mueller et al. (2016) and Ganong
and Noel (2017). Both empirical papers look at the persistence of biased beliefs
over time, with Ganong and Noel going on to evaluate how consumption patterns for
unemployed workers evolve over the duration of unemployment spells.
Estimates of UI hazard rates and the effects of UI on consumer choices have been
studied in depth. The seminal work on constructing hazard rates for UI exit was Katz
and Meyer (1990), who used data from Pennsylvania and Missouri and found a flat
hazard rate over the profile of unemployment duration.2 In the same set of studies,
it was found that the average job searcher without a prospect of being recalled to
their previous job searched an average of 12 hours per week Katz and Meyer (1990);
Krueger and Mueller (2011).3 Empirical work linking unemployment insurance and
precautionary saving was explored in SIPP data by Engen and Gruber (2001), who
found that UI benefits crowd out precautionary saving. Subsequent work focuses
on consumption smoothing and intra-household risk as it relates to precautionary
saving Ortigueira and Siassi (2013). Studies linking unemployment insurance and
reservation wages are scarce, but two were conducted by Feldstein and Poterba (1984)
and Fishe (1982). Both articles estimated that higher unemployment benefits raised
the reservation wage by as much as 40%.
The literature on sufficient statistic approaches to optimal UI benefit levels, the
broad set of models under which Spinnewijn (2015) falls, is summarized by Chetty
(2009). Within this theoretical context, many papers have used the above empiri-
1See for example Benabou and Tirole (2002), Compte and Postlewaite (2004), Van den Steen
(2004), and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)
2See also Krueger and Mueller (2011), Chetty et al. (2007b), Meyer (1990), and Moffitt (1985).
3See also Barron and Mellow (1979), Krueger and Mueller (2010) and Wanberg et al. (2012).
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cal work as motivation. The original paper, Baily (1978), captured all three ideas
of search effort, precautionary saving, and reservation wages in a simple two-period
model. Chetty (2008) relaxed some of Baily’s assumptions to derive a more general
formula for optimal UI benefits. This formula can be estimated in several ways, either
through a consumption-based approach Baily (1978), by making use of reservation
wages Shimer and Werning (2007), or by breaking down the formula into moral hazard
and liquidity effects Chetty (2008). This literature relies on fully informed rational
agents. Mullainathan et al. (2012) give a review of reduced form approaches to esti-
mating the influence of non-standard agents on optimal policies. In other insurance
markets, many authors have already used behavioral biases as a justification for in-
terventions.4 There have also been papers that use the variation in risk preferences
across agents to discuss the optimal design of insurance and consumer contracts.5
2 Model
This section discusses the framework for biased beliefs, as presented in Spinnewijn
(2015). The model falls into the sufficient statistics literature, which frames the
optimal unemployment insurance decision in terms of observables from the data rather
than deep structural parameters. This model nests the rational expectations model of
Chetty (2008), who extends Baily (1978) to allow for savings and benefits form leisure.
However, it rules out general equilibrium effects, distortions due to firm behavior, or
congestion externalities in labor supply.6
In Spinnewijn’s model, all risk-averse agents are employed in the first period and
become unemployed in the second period. In the first period, agents decide how much
of their after-tax wage w−τ to save s ∈ [0, w]. Any savings allow the agent to increase
second period consumption by s(1+r). In the second period, agents decide how much
effort e to put into searching for a job, where e is a utility cost. Given effort e, an
4See Santos-Pinto (2008), de la Rosa (2011) and Grubb and Osborne (2015).
5See for example Sandroni and Squintani (2007), Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Grubb (2009) and
Spinnewijn (2013).
6This is likely not true, since experience ratings weigh on employers when they decide to fire
employees. As an example, see Hagedorn et al. (2016).
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agent finds a job with probability pi(e) ∈ [0, 1], which is assumed to be increasing and
concave in effort. If the agent finds a job, they earn wage w again and pay tax τ
for unemployment benefits. If the agent is unsuccessful, they collect unemployment
benefit b. Given an unemployment policy (b, τ), the agent has expected utility:
u(w − τ − s) + β[pi(e)(u(w − τ + (1 + r)s) + (1− pi(e))u(b+ (1 + r)s)− e] (1.1)
The discount factor β is standard. For notational ease, write:
c0 = w − τ − s (1.2)
ce = w − τ + (1 + r)s (1.3)
cu = b+ (1 + r)s (1.4)
so that the consumption wedge between being employed and unemployed can be
defined as ce − cu = w − τ − b.
The agent will choose an effort level e and savings level s to maximize their
expected utility, taking as given the unemployment policy (b, τ).
U(b, τ) = max
e,s
u(w− τ −s)+β[pi(e)(u(w− τ +(1+r)s)+(1−pi(e))u(b+(1+r)s)−e]
(1.5)
First order conditions yield:
pi′(e)[u(ce)− u(cu)]− 1 = 0 (1.6)
− u′(c0) + β(1 + r){pi(e)[u′(ce)− u′(cu)] + u′(cu)} = 0 (1.7)
These are familiar looking first order conditions. The search effort condition (Equa-
tion 1.6) equates the marginal cost and benefit of searching for a job in the second
period. With the UI benefit b present in the problem, the agent faces a moral hazard
problem. Having UI benefits available diminishes the marginal benefit to searching for
work. The savings condition (Equation 1.7) equates the marginal utility of consump-
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tion in the first and the second periods. An agent would want to save in period one
for the chance they could be unemployed in period two, but the presence of UI bene-
fits in period two smooths the consumption in period two between the employed and
unemployed states. This reduces the agent’s desire to save in period one. Generally
speaking, these represent standard intratemporal and intertemporal constraints.
However, agents will behave according to their perceived job-finding probability.
Define the perceived job-finding probability as pˆi(e) ∈ [0, 1], which is also assumed
increasing and concave in search effort e. There are no other restrictions given here on
how the true and perceived job-finding probabilities are related. I define the difference
in levels pˆi(e) − pi(e) as the baseline bias and the difference in margins pˆi′(e) − pi′(e)
as the control bias.
Definition 1 An agent is baseline optimistic (pessimistic) if pˆi(e) ≥ (≤)pi(e) for
all e ≥ 0.
Definition 2 An agent is control optimistic (pessimistic) if pˆi′(e) ≥ (≤)pi′(e) for
all e ≥ 0
Note here that the idea of baseline bias is what was measured and observed in
Price et al. (2004). A baseline optimistic worker will have a perceived job-finding
probability that is greater than their true job-finding probability at every level of
search effort. Control bias, however, has not previously been estimated. This paper
is the first to provide an estimate of the degree of control bias that prevails among
unemployed workers. Control optimistic workers believe that each extra hour of search
effort increases their job-finding probability by more than it does in reality.
As a result of this bias, agents will choose an effort level e and savings level s to
maximize their perceived expected utility taking the policy (b, τ) as given.
Uˆ(b, τ) = max
e,s
u(w− τ −s)+β[pˆi(e)(u(w− τ +(1+r)s)+(1− pˆi(e))u(b+(1+r)s)−e]
(1.8)
First order conditions yield:
pˆi′(e)[u(ce)− u(cu)]− 1 = 0 (1.9)
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− u′(c0) + β(1 + r){pˆi(e)[u′(ce)− u′(cu)] + u′(cu)} = 0 (1.10)
These are nearly identical to the set of conditions derived when agents are not biased,
as differences only occur in the parts of the equation where job-finding probabilities
appear. Moving forward, variables associated with the agent’s maximization of their
perceived expected utility will be denoted with the superscript b and variables asso-
ciated with the agent’s maximization of their true expected utility will be denoted
with the superscript ub.
The constraints for search behavior, shown in Equations 1.6 and 1.9, will govern
the relationship between control bias and an unemployed worker’s search effort. For
a fixed level of saving, the constraints imply:
pi′(eub) = pˆi′(eb) (1.11)
If an agent is control optimistic and the assumptions that both the true and perceived
job finding functions are concave in search effort hold, then this condition will only
hold if eub < eb. This implies that a control optimistic agent will exert more search
effort, a result coming from overestimating the marginal benefit of more search effort.
Control pessimistic agents would result in eb < eub, implying less search effort exerted.
In theory, this would lead to greater search effort, offsetting the hazard problem
created by UI benefits. However, the results rest on the assumption that both of the
two types of job finding functions are increasing and concave.
Similarly, the constraints 1.7 and 1.10 will determine the relationship between
an unemployed worker’s savings and their baseline bias. Holding the level of effort
constant in these constraints, they jointly imply:
u′(cub0 )
pi(e)[u′(cube )− u′(cubu )] + u′(cubu )
=
u′(cb0)
pˆi(e)[u′(cbe)− u′(cbu)] + u′(cbu)
(1.12)
where cub0 = w− τ − sub, cb0 = w− τ − sb, cube = w− τ + (1 + r)sub, cubu = b+ (1 + r)sub,
cbe = w− τ + (1 + r)sb, and cbu = b+ (1 + r)sb. If an agent is baseline optimistic, this
equation will only hold if sb < sub. This implies that the baseline optimistic agent
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will save less for an unemployment spell because they underestimate the value of UI
and protect themselves less against unemployment risk through savings.7 Baseline
pessimistic agents will save more than their unbiased counterparts. In the unbiased
case, the consumption-smoothing benefit of UI payments already reduced precaution-
ary savings for unemployed workers. Baseline optimistic agents will exacerbate this
problem by seeing an even smaller benefit to saving for a possible unemployment
spell.
3 Data
The Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey (SUWNJ) collected information
from a subset of the universe of roughly 360,000 individuals receiving UI benefits in the
state of New Jersey as of September 28, 2009. Responses were received from 6,025
of the roughly 64,000 surveyed recipients. Each respondent was interviewed every
week for up to 24 weeks from October 2009 to April 2010, resulting in a total of over
39,000 weekly interviews. Initial work on the data done by Krueger and Mueller (2011)
confirms that, after applying the appropriate survey weights, the survey captured a
representative sample despite the high non-response rate.8 This is shown in Table
1.1. Mean UI benefits were about $400 per week, which amounts to nearly 55% of
the respondent’s previous weekly earnings. Demographic, education and earnings
statistics for the weighted group of respondents are all nearly the same as observed
in the universe.
While much of the survey focuses on emotional well-being, there is a significant
amount of data on job-search activity and sufficient data on job seeker perceptions
and savings. Most importantly, the survey asks for respondents’ perceptions about
their job-finding prospects (Table 1.2). Beliefs are reported about the probability
that job seekers will find a job within the next four weeks, as well as the number
of weeks they estimate it will take them to find a job. On average, respondents
predicted they would have a 29% chance to find a job within the next four weeks. This
7This result relies on the concavity of the utility function and the assumption that ce > cu.
8See Appendix 1.A for more detail on the survey sample.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Universe and Respondents
Unweighted Weighted
Universe Respondents Respondents
No. of observations 362,292 6,025 6,025
Previous earnings during base year (in dollars) $35,335 $48,994 $37,960
Weekly UI benefit $387 $442 $397
Weeks of UI paid by Sep. 28, 2009 30.6 40.7 27.4
Female 0.454 0.521 0.472
Race
Percent white 59.5 68.0 59.8
Percent black 20.1 15.3 20.0
Percent Hispanic 19.1 9.1 17.8
Education
Percent less than high school 15.6 7.0 14.1
Percent high school 43.3 26.0 45.1
Percent some college 22.2 26.4 22.1
Percent college 19.0 40.7 18.7
Notes: The universe is the group of individuals receiving UI benefits in New Jersey as
of September 28, 2009. From that universe, a sample of nearly 64,000 individuals were
surveyed and only a subset of those who were surveyed submitted responses. When sam-
ple weights are applied to account for non-response and selection probability, descriptive
statistics for the respondents are similar to those for the universe.
matches the estimate of 20 weeks of unemployment remaining reported in the survey.
Predictably, the reported probability of finding a job within the next four weeks is
declining in age and unemployment duration.9 A follow-up question inquires about
the length of time to reemployment if the worker searched an extra 7 hours per week.10
Respondents generally did not seem to think extra search effort would shorten their
unemployment spell. This set of survey questions provides the information needed
to measure the perceived job-finding rates of job seekers. A potential problem, as
outlined in the literature started by Manski (2004), is the possibility that respondents
may not be reporting their actual beliefs in the survey.11 I assume that subject
responses are generally accurate, as suggested by Manski (2004), and leave a more
detailed exploration of beliefs to future work.
9See Appendix 1.D for more detail.
10This length of time is only reported for those that thought more search would help their cause,
a small subset of those asked. When a respondent reports that they do not think extra search will
shorten their unemployment spell, I assume that the weeks to regain employment for this question
are the same as in the previous question.
11In particular, the elicitations may not reflect the true beliefs of agents due to an anchoring bias,
bunching, laziness, or a lack of knowledge. It may also be the case that the beliefs are being swayed
by observable decisions, such as leaving the labor force or acceptance of a job offer. See Appendix
1.A for more on this survey data.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics on Job-Finding Prospects
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Baseline beliefs
Job-finding probability within 4 weeks 5,827 0.293 0.260
Weeks to regain employment 5,628 20.2 26.4
Control beliefs
Weeks to regain employment with extra search 5,633 19.9 26.6
Notes: Questions about respondent beliefs were asked once every four weeks. In
the section on control beliefs, less than 20% of respondents reported that extra
search effort would reduce their unemployment spell. It is assumed that respon-
dents who reported that extra search effort would not shorten their unemployment
spell believe the number of weeks it will take for them to regain employment is
the same with and without extra search.
The data provide a rough measure of how long survey respondents have been
unemployed, as given by the number of weeks they have claimed UI benefits, but very
little indication of what happens to respondents when they leave the survey. I want
an estimate of when respondents regain employment, which I infer from the available
data by estimating a discrete-time hazard model. However, the unemployment exit
rate I estimate contains not only individuals that find a job during the survey, but
also those that leave the sample due to survey attrition or leave UI, with or without
a job.12
Data on savings and search effort are also available in the survey, with the richest
set of information being about search effort (Table 1.3). Respondents were asked to
keep a time diary as well as to summarize their job search activities over the past
week. The result is a set of information about the time spent searching, the methods
used, and the quantity of applications filed.13 Respondents spent an average of 14
hours per week searching for a job, submitting nearly six applications each week. Most
search time was spent doing self-directed work, such as directly contacting employers,
going to interviews, or filling out applications.
12Individuals leaving UI without jobs are most likely to have exhausted their maximum duration
of benefits.
13There is also information on the number of job offers received, reservation wages, restrictions
that job searchers faced, and training programs attended. I will focus on hours spent searching, but
results are generally unchanged when using the number of applications submitted. For the hours
measure, there were some extreme values - some reported searching over 100 hours per week. To
address this, the hours spent searching are windsorized at the 98% level.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics on Job Search
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Total hours searched in past 7 days 35,183 14.0 18.0
Hours of self-directed search 35,569 10.1 15.9
Hours of aided search 36,215 3.5 8.7
Applications submitted in past 7 days 26,946 5.9 9.4
Notes: Total hours searched and number of applications submitted are reported
as summary values by respondents at the end of every seven day period. This can
be split into self-direct search and aided search. Self-directed search includes con-
tacting employers directly, contacting friends or relatives, attending job training,
placing or answering ads, going to interviews, sending resumes, filling out ap-
plications, or looking at ads. Aided search includes contacting public or private
employment agencies, contacting university employment centers or checking a
union register.
Savings are reported in an entry survey answered by respondents during their first
survey week, indicating a rough amount of money available in a savings account (Table
1.4). Most respondents indicated that they had some savings. Respondents report
how much they have in savings in discrete bins, with the majority of respondents who
do have savings reporting they have less than $10,000 remaining. Subsequent surveys
ask about the availability and sources of emergency funds, homeownership, mortgage
and credit card debt, and other measures of liquidity constraints (whether they’ve
sold assets and their sources of funding for different purchases). While not reported
here, the data in subsequent surveys could be used to provide a broader picture of
the financial constraints facing unemployed workers.
4 Bias Measurement
I estimate unemployment hazard rates using a discrete-time hazard model and con-
trolling for worker characteristics and job market conditions. This provides true job-
finding probabilities for each survey respondent. I combine these probabilities with
the subjective probabilities and self-reported search effort to characterize the degree of
bias among workers. As a preview of results, I find that unemployed workers display
a large degree of baseline optimism, over-predicting their job-finding probability by
an average of nearly 20 percentage points, but they exhibit, on average, no significant
control bias.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics on Savings
Variable Observations
Do you have savings? 5,943
Yes 3,614
No 2,329
How much savings do you have? 3,330
Less than $10,000 1,888
$10,000 to $24,999 483
$25,000 to $49,999 312
$50,000 to $99,999 236
$100,000 or more 411
Notes: Questions about savings were only asked in the initial survey for each
respondent. If a respondent reported to have savings available, they were asked
a follow-up question inquiring how much they had available in savings.
4.1 Hazard Model
In order to assess whether beliefs are systematically biased, I first estimate the true
job-finding probabilities of workers. In the literature, the standard approach is to
estimate a hazard rate. In hazard models, the technique is meant to measure the
rate at which a ‘failure’ event will occur. The rate is based upon data that identifies
which observations are at risk of failing at a given point in time, and is calculated by
taking a ratio of the subset of observations that fail compared to the total number of
observations at risk for each possible point in time. For work related to unemployment
insurance, the ‘failure’ event is leaving UI. The hazard rate is interpreted as the
probability that an individual will leave the UI program at any possible duration of
unemployment.
I design my empirical strategy to overcome two limitations of the data. The first
is that the survey is not administrative data, and hence there is less certainty about
when people leave the UI rolls than in the estimates of Krueger and Mueller (2011).
A more nuanced problem is that my variable of interest is not when a worker leaves
unemployment insurance, but when they finally leave unemployment. These need not
be the same. In many cases, especially during the SUWNJ sample period, workers
ran out of UI benefit payments, and by default left the UI program, before finding a
job. My main interest is in the behavior of unemployed workers with biased beliefs
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about their job-finding probability, not their probability of leaving unemployment
insurance. In that sense, I estimate a fundamentally different value. I interpret this
unemployment hazard rate as the true job-finding probability.
As a first step, I define the concept of ‘failure’ for this paper. Using a large
subset of survey questions, I identify respondents that have met the requirements to
exit UI into full-time employment. Starting with information on job acceptances, I
restrict the set of newly employed workers to those that accept jobs offering either
high enough wages to surpass their UI benefit payment or jobs offering more than
35 hours of work per week. There are often delays between job acceptance and start
date, which are also factored into the date of exit from unemployment. On rare
occasions, some unemployed workers report accepting two separate full-time offers.
In those cases, I assume the worker has re-entered unemployment for a brief period
of time in between their two job offers.14 After factoring in the ‘failure’ criteria, 86%
of respondents leave the survey without reporting to have found a job. The data are
severely censored.
The literature that studies UI exit hazard rates typically uses a Kaplan-Meier
nonparametric hazard model. These hazard rates are unconditional, and are not
estimated controlling for any observable characteristics. An alternative method is
the Cox proportional hazards model. This is a semiparametric model that allows for
observable characteristics of the respondents to influence the hazard rates. In the Cox
hazard model, I can estimate unemployment exit hazard rates that are conditional on
respondent’s observable characteristics. However, there are still two main drawbacks
to the Cox approach. First, the Cox model cannot account for time-varying covariates.
Given the time period that the SUWNJ was collected, it is reasonable to assume that
the statewide job market conditions varied between October 2009 and April 2010. In
addition, the probability of finding a job may vary with each individual’s remaining
weeks of UI benefits available.15 Since the stock of UI benefit eligible weeks falls
14Alternatively, assuming that the worker only accepts the offer they self-reported as their ‘best’
offer yields nearly identical results. This is due to the small subsample of respondents for whom this
particular problem applies.
15This accounting factors in several extensions of unemployment insurance benefit extensions
that occurred prior to or during this sample period. In particular, Emergency Unemployment
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as a worker remains unemployed, this covariate cannot be incorporated. Second, in
order to use the continuous hazard function, the Cox model assumes that the ‘failure’
events occur in continuous time. This prevents any ties in ‘failure’ time. However,
exits from unemployment are recorded in terms of weeks in the data. At nearly every
unemployment duration, there are multiple respondents that exit unemployment and
are tied in ‘failure’ time. While there are methods to modify the Cox estimation, I
opt to use an alternative approach.16
I estimate a discrete-time hazard model, as developed in Glennon and Nigro
(2005). This method has the distinct advantage of resolving both issues associated
with the Cox proportional hazard model. In this model, I can control for time-varying
labor market conditions, as well as the evolution of UI eligibility over the duration of
unemployment. I organize the data into an event history format, ordering the set of
observations for each respondent from their earliest to latest survey. This model can
then be estimated using a standard logistic regression. I estimate this model control-
ling for measures of the respondent’s education, marital status, number of children,
previous income, severance pay, savings, spousal job status, gender, race/ethnicity,
remaining UI eligibility, and generally for time-varying New Jersey labor market con-
ditions.17 Results of the discrete-time hazard model are reported in Figure 1.1.
I convert these hazard rates, which I interpret as the true job-finding probability,
to make them comparable to the survey. The hazard rates describe the probability
the respondent will find a job in the current week, but the survey is concerned with
whether a respondent will find a job in the next four weeks. To adjust, I multiply
the hazard rates by four. Comparing these probabilities across various respondent
characteristics, the job-finding rate is decreasing with respondent age, savings and
Compensation (EUC) was extended in New Jersey in early November 2009, just after the survey
had started. This extension prolonged benefits for many survey respondents from a maximum of
72 weeks to 99 weeks. New Jersey also allows for extensions of UI benefits after eligibility has been
exhausted through the Additional Benefits during Training (ABT) program. Unemployed workers
can receive up to 26 additional weeks of UI benefits if they enroll is an approved training program.
16See Appendix 1.C for results from Kaplan-Meier and Cox estimations.
17While not executed here, a useful extension would be to account for unobserved heterogeneity
among the respondents. There are likely unobservable characteristics specific to each respondent
that influences their overall job finding rate, beyond what can be determined using observable
characteristics. For an outline of the methodological approach, see Jenkins (2017).
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Figure 1.1: Average Discrete-Time Hazard Rates
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Notes: Predicted Logit hazard rates with 95% confidence bands. Hazards are weighted with survey
weights for respondents. Standard errors are derived asymptotically and used to calculate 95% con-
fidence bands. Symmetry of confidence bands arises from symmetry of standard errors in linear
prediction, which is used to transform the logit standard errors. Discrete-time estimation controls
for survey respondent’s education, marital status, number of children, previous income, severance
pay, savings, spousal job status, gender, race/ethnicity, remaining UI eligibility, and generally for
time-varying New Jersey labor market conditions.
unemployment duration, but is increasing with respondent education.18
I estimate the following quadratic regression using ordinary least squares to predict
how the true job-finding rate is related to the worker’s level of search effort:
pi = β0 + β1e+ β2e
2 + ε (1.13)
where pi is the estimated probability that the worker will find a job in the next four
weeks and e is the total number of hours spent searching for a job over the previous
seven days. Results are listed in Table 1.5. Notably, the results suggest that the
true job-finding function is both increasing and concave in search effort. This result
confirms the assumption made in the sufficient statistics literature and suggests that
the theoretical implication from the section 2 of the paper, that baseline optimistic
workers will have less precautionary savings, should hold.
I plot predicted point estimates of this relationship at each level of effort, where
effort is the sum of the total hours spent searching for a job over the past seven days.
18See Appendix 1.D for more detail.
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This is presented in Figure 1.2. The average is roughly 8.5%, meaning respondents
have an 8.5% change to be employed in the next four weeks. While not reported
in the paper, estimates of the true job-finding probability as a function of different
measures of search effort, such as applications submitted within the last seven days,
yields qualitatively similar results.19
Figure 1.2: True Job-Finding Probability by Search Effort
8.
5
9
9.
5
10
Tr
ue
 jo
b-
fin
di
ng
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 20 40 60 80
Average hours searched last 7 days
95% CI Fitted values
Source: Office of Population Research at Princeton University
Notes: Estimated hazard rates at each level of search effort. Quadratic estimation using ordinary
least squares. Standard errors are derived asymptotically and used to calculate 95% confidence bands.
4.2 Perceived Job Finding Function
I construct the perceived job-finding function pˆi(e) using survey answers about a
worker’s job-finding probability over the next four weeks.20 Therefore, the perceived
job-finding rate is the reported probability that the worker will find a job in the next
four weeks. I estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares to predict
19This result passes other robustness checks, as well. Generally, the function remains largely the
same if workers who are waiting to start a job are dropped from the sample and workers who claim
to have given up searching are dropped from the sample.
20This relies upon the assumption that people generally report something close to their true beliefs
in the survey. One way to check this would be to use a method to extract true beliefs from subjective
survey responses, as outlined in Hendren (2013). This exercise is left for future work, but is outlined
in Appendix 1.B.
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how the perceived job-finding rate is related to the worker’s level of search effort:
pˆi = β0 + β1e+ β2e
2 + ε (1.14)
where pˆi is the reported probability that the worker will find a job in the next four
weeks and e is the total number of hours spent search for a job over the previous
seven days. Results are listed in Table 1.5. Notably, the results show no evidence
that the perceived job-finding function is increasing or concave in search effort. This
result suggests that the theoretical implication from the section 2 of the paper, that
control optimistic workers will exert more search effort, may not hold.
Table 1.5: Estimated Effect of Job Search on Job-Finding Probabilities
pˆi(e) pi(e)
Perceived Prob. True Prob.
Total search hours -0.040 0.027***
(0.062) (0.004)
(Total search hours)2 0.001 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Constant 29.242*** 8.586***
(0.537) (0.038)
N = 5,529 N = 13,370
Notes: Regression is ordinary least squares with standard asymptotically derived
variance estimator. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are signifi-
cant at: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*).
Again, I plot predicted point estimates of this relationship, where effort is the sum
of the total hours spent searching for a job over the past seven days. This is presented
in Figure 1.3. The average is roughly 30%, meaning respondents thought that there
was a 30% chance that they would be employed in the next four weeks. Robustness
checks with different measures of job search effort and sample adjustments also yield
qualitatively similar results.21
21Another robustness check particular to the perceived rate depends upon the survey administra-
tion. I can control for the way in which the perceived job-finding probability question is asked on
the survey, but this also yields little difference in average perceptions across different search efforts.
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Figure 1.3: Perceived Job-Finding Probability by Search Effort
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Source: Office of Population Research at Princeton University
Notes: Estimated perceived job-finding probabilities at each level of search effort. Quadratic estima-
tion using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are derived asymptotically and used to calculate
95% confidence bands.
4.3 Baseline and Control Bias
I use the perceived job-finding probability estimates pˆi(e) and the true job-finding
probability estimates pi(e) to calculate the baseline bias pˆi(e) − pi(e). I take the
difference of the two probabilities for each observation, accounting for the standard
errors reported in the discrete-time hazard estimation. Figure 1.4 shows the average
baseline bias at different levels of search effort. Given that the perceived job-finding
probability is roughly 30% and the true job-finding probability is around 8.5%, there
is a consistent optimistic bias over all levels of search effort. This bias falls with age
and unemployment duration, suggesting that unemployed workers correct this bias
over time.22 An alternative measurement would be to monotonically transform these
probabilities into the remaining unemployment duration.23 The bias would imply,
on average, that it takes 26 more weeks to find a job than expected for unemployed
workers. In Price et al. (2004), the authors found that unemployed workers in their
sample remained unemployed for 16 weeks longer than expected. However, there
22See Appendix 1.D for more detail.
23This is likely an upper bound on the number of weeks until employment is found since the hazard
rate will decline as the worker remains unemployed for a longer period of time.
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Figure 1.4: Baseline Bias by Search Effort
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Source: Office of Population Research at Princeton University
Notes: Average of baseline bias at each level of search effort. Baseline bias is calculated as the differ-
ence between perceived and true job finding probabilities. Standard errors are derived asymptotically
and used to calculate 95% confidence bands.
are some clear differences between the two data sets. The SUWNJ sample is 86%
censored. This is significantly less than in Price et al. (2004), where roughly 20% of
the sample was censored. The two samples were also collected at drastically different
time periods. The SUWNJ was collected near the end of the 2009 recession, so the
exaggerated bias is likely the result of a shift to lower true job-finding rates. Price et
al. was conducted in the late 1990s, concluding well before the recession that began
in 2000.
Control bias is more difficult to measure. For the perceived influence, I use the
number of weeks that people report they expect it to take to find a job, as well as the
number of weeks they would expect it to take to find a job with seven extra hours of
search per week.24 I convert both of these reported numbers of weeks into an implied
job-finding probability. These allow me to find an estimate of the change in the
perceived job-finding probability when a respondent spends more time searching for
a job. For the true influence, I use the estimated job-finding function and compute the
difference for each respondent between their job finding probability at their current
24Recall, for a large group of the sample, there was no difference between these two values. This
suggests that the perceived influence over job finding rates is zero.
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level of search effort and an effort level seven hours higher. With those two measures,
I can take the difference to get their true level of influence. Then, I compute the
control bias by finding pˆi′(e) − pi′(e). The average level of control bias at different
levels of search effort are reported in Figure 1.5. Respondents generally show no
Figure 1.5: Control Bias in Weeks by Search Effort
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Notes: Average of control bias at each level of search effort. Control bias is calculated as the difference
between perceived influence over the job finding probability and true influence over the job finding
probability. Standard errors are derived asymptotically and used to calculate 95% confidence bands.
pattern of control optimism or pessimism over all levels of search effort. This holds
true along all respondent characteristics.
5 Testing Implications of UI Models
In this section, I formally test predictions of optimal UI models. To briefly preview the
results, I find evidence that baseline optimistic workers save less for unemployment
spells than baseline pessimistic workers and control optimistic workers spend less time
searching for a job than control pessimistic workers. This suggests that policymakers
should account for the presence of biased beliefs in estimating the effects of UI benefits
on worker incentives.
The model of optimal unemployment insurance with biased beliefs implies that
a control optimistic unemployed worker will overestimate the return to extra job
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search. This overestimation will, when perceived and true job-finding probabilities
are increasing and concave in search effort, increase job search, offsetting the moral
hazard problem created by the presence of UI benefits. However, during the data
analysis, I discovered that the perceived job-finding function was not concave in search
effort. Since there is not a clear shape to the perceived job-finding function, there is
not a clear prediction for the regression.
I run an ordinary least squares regression to evaluate the relationship between
search effort and control bias.
efforti = β0 + β1I(COi) +X ′iβ + εi (1.15)
The regression controls for respondent characteristics and the survey date in the vector
Xi. The primary coefficient of interest is β1, which describes the relative search effort
of a control optimist compared to a control pessimist. Results are reported in Table
1.6. The results indicate that a control optimist searches for a job a significantly
smaller amount of time each week than a control pessimist. On average, a control
optimist spends nearly four fewer hours searching for a job, which is a 26% decline.
I interpret this result as suggesting that when control optimists overestimate the
return to extra job search, they view it necessary to complete a smaller total number
of search hours to achieve the same level of job-finding probability.25
In the theoretical model, it is also implied that a baseline optimistic unemployed
worker will underestimate the need to smooth consumption when unemployed. This
underestimation will lead to lower precautionary savings, exacerbating the lower sav-
ings created through the consumption smoothing benefit of UI payments. Slightly
constrained by the data available, I run an interval regression. Interval regression is
a generalization of the tobit estimation method used to deal with censored data. In
this case, the data I have available only reports a bin into which each respondent’s
savings falls. Defining the upper and lower bounds of each bin, I can run an interval
25This is akin to relative substitution and income effects. While the relative reward for search
should encourage more search, the so-called income effect will discourage workers from increasing
their search effort because they feel their current effort is producing a larger payoff.
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Table 1.6: Regression of Job Search and Savings on Bias Measures
Total search hours Savings
Unemployment duration 0.012 288.27***
(0.016) (43.11)
I(Control optimism) -3.645***
(0.968)
Baseline bias -0.007
(0.014)
I(Baseline optimism) -8,360.49**
(3,720.74)
Control bias -257.31*
(152.84)
N = 2,071 N = 2,073
Notes: The search effort regression is estimated by ordinary least squares with
asymptotically derived standard errors. The search effort regression also controls
for sex, education, marital status, number of children, previous income, sever-
ance pay, savings, spousal work status, and survey date. The savings regression
is estimated by interval regression with asymptotically derived standard errors.
The savings regression includes all regressors used in search effort regression ex-
cept savings, and adds a measure of search effort. Coefficients are significant at:
1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*).
regression with the censored savings data as the dependent variable and the measures
of bias and other controls as independent variables.
savings binsi = β0 + β1I(BOi) +X ′iβ + εi (1.16)
Again, β1 is the primary coefficient of interest, which describes the relative savings
behavior of a baseline optimist compared to a baseline pessimist. Results for this
interval regression are reported in the second column of Table 1.6. The results indi-
cate that a baseline optimist has a significantly smaller amount of savings remaining
compared to a baseline pessimist who has been unemployed the same length of time.
On average, a baseline optimist has over $8,500 less remaining in savings when they
reach the same unemployment duration as a baseline pessimist. This suggests that
the theoretical predictions in the model are correct, and that baseline optimists un-
derestimate their need to smooth consumption when unemployed. There are other
measures of financial constraint that indicate baseline optimists are generally less
well-equipped to endure a long unemployment spell. For example, baseline optimists
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also have $4,000 more in credit card debt compared to baseline pessimists at the same
unemployment duration.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This empirical exercise provides measurement of two ways that unemployed workers
may be biased about their job finding beliefs. In doing so, I have introduced the
discrete-time hazard model into the UI literature. Among unemployed New Jersey
workers in 2009-2010, I have shown that a significant underestimation of unemploy-
ment duration exists and that this is correlated with less savings during unemploy-
ment. I have also shown that, while there is not a systematic over- or underestimation
of the influence an unemployed worker can have over their job-finding rate through
job search, the subset of unemployed workers who do overestimate the value of extra
search tend to spend less time searching for a job.
Several avenues for future research present themselves from this work. One poten-
tial extension could be gaining an understanding of why unemployed workers harbor
these unrealistic expectations. The behavior of biased unemployed workers, in which
they seem to put off searching for a job and avoid saving for the possibility of un-
employment, appears to be consistent with present bias. Introduced in O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), unemployed workers with present bias would more heavily weight
the payoffs closer to present time. This would include a desire to procrastinate on
‘immediate-cost’ activities, such as applying to or searching for a job. A similar result
has been found by DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) in a paper studying impatient
job searchers. New theoretical models that replace the forms of baseline and control
bias seen here with an alternative form of discounting could yield a complementary
approach to explain the empirical results in this paper.26
Optimism among job searchers, which is characterized by less saving and less job
search, seems to suggest that unemployed workers could improve their welfare if UI
benefits were permanently extended. As unemployment spells endure for longer than
job searchers expect, the spell is prolonged by a lack of search effort and potentially
26One such approach is using hyperbolic discounting, as in Paserman (2008).
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characterized by lower consumption as searchers exhaust their savings. However, re-
cent research by Ganong and Noel (2017) utilizes spending data to show that the
path of consumption during unemployment is fairly flat. Even when UI benefit el-
igibility ends, the drop in consumption is just over 10 percentage points. Ganong
and Noel calibrate Spinnewijn’s model with overly optimistic job searchers and show
that the model would predict a much larger decline in consumption. Even though
optimism among job searchers leads to less savings available during unemployment, it
appears that spending is maintained through the use of other available assets. Given
this result, and other recent work studying UI benefit extensions that have found
the provision of benefits for a longer period of time to further reduce job search ef-
fort (Hagedorn et al. (2016)), permanent extensions to UI benefits seem to be an
ill-advised solution.
A more promising approach may be an information program aimed at making
unemployed workers aware of their optimistic bias. This type of intervention could
encourage unemployed workers to put forth more search effort during their current
unemployment spell and to start establishing better savings habits to prepare for the
possibility of a future unemployment spell. Information interventions with institu-
tional support have been shown to have significant impacts on worker behavior. For
example, in a new paper by Barr and Turner (2017), the authors disseminated infor-
mation about the benefits and costs of post-secondary programs that could improve
future employment outcomes. The authors found that unemployed workers who re-
ceive this information were 40% more likely to enroll in a post-secondary program.
Such an information policy about the behavior of optimistic job searchers could help
shorten unemployment spells and further smooth consumption of unemployed work-
ers.
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1.A SUWNJ Data
Krueger and Mueller (2011) started with the complete list of 362,292 UI recipients
as of September 28, 2009. They ended up obtaining a sample of 63,813 UI recipi-
ents which were broken down into 18 strata. Long-term unemployed workers were
intentionally oversampled.
Table 1.7: Sample by Number of Weeks of UI Benefits Paid on Current UI Claims
as of September 2009
With Without
e-mail address e-mail address Total
zero to 2 weeks 5,000 2,000 7,000
10 to 12 weeks 5,000 2,000 7,000
20 to 22 weeks 5,000 2,000 7,000
30 to 32 weeks 5,000 2,000 7,000
40 to 42 weeks 5,000 2,000 7,000
50 to 53 weeks 5,000 2,000 7,000
60 to 63 weeks less than 5,000 2,000 less than 7,000
64 to 71 weeks nonzero nonzero
72 to 77 weeks less than 10,000 4,000 less than 14,000
more than 77 weeks nonzero nonzero
TOTAL 45,813 18,000 63,813
Entry occurred between October 13, 2009 and November 3, 2009 following invi-
tations (by e-mail or mail) on October 13. Overall, 6,025 workers participated and
5,680 entered within the first 2 weeks (October 13-October 27). Individuals were
invited to participate for 12 consecutive weeks, with the weekly interview invitations
sent 7 days after the most recent interview. In early January 20, individuals with 60
or more weeks (the last 4 strata) of UI benefits paid at the start of the study were
invited for the extended study (additional 12 weeks). Out of 2,022 eligible, 1,148
filled out at least one of those surveys. Response rate (adjusted for mailing errors)
was 9.7%, and was higher for the e-mail address group. Respondents completed an
average of 4.1 surveys after the initial interview.
Comparing the sample frame to the respondents shows that the respondents have
higher earnings, higher benefit amounts, were more likely female, white, non-Hispanic,
and college graduates. Therefore, Krueger and Mueller created survey weights for the
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initial interview using a logit regression, where the dependent variable is one if the
person responded, and zero if the person in the sample frame did not respond. Entry-
wave survey weights were computed as the inverse of the predicted value of the logit
regression and then rescaled to sum to the total number of individuals in the universe.
I use these weights to survey set the data and produce weighted statistics in Table
1.1.
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1.B Subjective Elicitations
Manski (2004) thinks that people report their true beliefs, but that may not be true
in this data. Even if respondents are not be lying, there are several reasons that they
may not accurately report their true perceptions. For example, they could be lazy
when answering the questions, they could not know how to form a forecast of their
perceived job-finding rate, or they could just be bunching near round numbers. It is
also possible that they just have some extra information unobservable in the survey
data. Looking at the reported job-finding probabilities over the next four weeks and
the expected time to find a job, there are some obvious problems. For the job-finding
Figure 1.6: Subjective Elicitations
(a) Perceived Job-Finding Rates (b) Perceived Unemployment Durations
probabilities, there is clear bunching at 0%, 50% and 100%. For the extremes, it
could be that people are resigned to leaving the labor force or that they know they’ll
be accepting a position soon. At the 50% mark, it could be that it is a simply
percentage to pick out. There was a period during the survey where the sliding scale
for the question started at 50%, so a concern could be that people were framed in their
thinking and simply failed to move the slider. However, a quick elimination of those
respondents show that does not appear to be the case. Looking at the unemployment
durations, the same bunching appears at 50 weeks, 100 weeks and 200 weeks. This
appears to be a less severe problem in this question, though.
Hendren (2013) develops a way to use this type of subjective data in evaluating the
insurance market, which suffers from an adverse selection problem. To implement this,
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I would need to introduce a third type of probability - the reported job-finding rate
p¯i(e). This reported rate would be represented by the actual survey responses, which
could be interpreted as a noisy measure of the agent’s beliefs. In this formulation,
the perceived probability pˆi(e) is private information and needs to be derived from
the reported probabilities provided in the survey data.
There is a complication, however, due to the fact that the labor market is different
than the insurance market. Hendren addresses the adverse selection problem in the
insurance market, which is preventing trade from occurring between high risk people
and insurance providers. In the case of unemployment insurance, there is a moral
hazard problem that results from private information. The presence of moral hazard
does not prevent the trade from occurring, but it prevents some people from leaving
UI more quickly. I will need to adjust Hendren for this moral hazard problem, using
his same methods for identifying private information.
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1.C Alternative Hazard Model Estimation
Figure 1.7: Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates
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Figure 1.8: Cox Proportional Hazard Rates
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1.D Job-finding Probabilities and Bias By Characteristic
Table 1.8: Perceived Job-Finding Rate by Characteristic
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Entire sample 5,827 29.3 Marital status
Age Single 1,322 33.3
30-34 427 35.1 Married 3,180 28.1
35-39 447 33.0 Divorced 771 26.7
40-44 693 32.0 Unemployment duration
45-49 835 29.9 10-19 weeks 366 35.3
50-54 1,056 28.6 20-29 weeks 462 33.8
55-59 1,102 26.0 30-39 weeks 449 30.3
60-64 773 21.1 40-49 weeks 453 29.3
Education 50-59 weeks 393 30.5
High school 821 31.2 60-69 weeks 360 28.8
Some college 1,714 28.7 70-79 weeks 694 26.5
College 1,837 29.5 80-89 weeks 1,306 28.1
Graduate school 914 29.1 90-99 weeks 948 27.3
2008 Household income Credit card debt at time of entry survey
$20,000-$29,999 592 28.4 Less than $1,000 1,474 26.7
$30,000-$39,999 538 30.4 $1,000-$2,499 677 27.6
$40,000-$49,999 522 27.8 $2,500-$9,999 906 29.5
$50,000-$59,999 444 29.7 $10,000-$19,999 551 28.8
$60,000-$69,999 372 29.6 $20,000 or more 544 28.2
$70,000-$79,999 357 26.7 Savings at time of entry survey
$80,000-$89,999 338 28.4 Less than $10,000 1,837 30.1
$90,000-$99,999 390 28.2 $10,000-$24,999 528 28.9
$100,000-$149,999 903 28.9 $25,000-$49,999 361 25.8
$150,000+ 584 28.1 $50,000-$99,999 306 23.4
Home purchase price $100,000 or more 558 24.9
$100,000-$149,999 553 27.4 Sex
$150,000-$199,999 512 27.0 Male 2,673 29.6
$200,000-$299,999 729 30.7 Female 3,154 29.1
$300,000-$399,999 410 27.8
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Table 1.9: True Job-Finding Rate by Characteristic
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Entire sample 14,084 8.8 Marital status
Age
30-34 944 10.2 Married 13,271 8.7
35-39 922 10.2
40-44 1,743 9.0 Unemployment duration
45-49 2,087 9.2 10-19 weeks 1,330 9.6
50-54 2,732 8.5 20-29 weeks 1,558 9.2
55-59 3,150 8.6 30-39 weeks 1,400 9.3
60-64 2,069 7.8 40-49 weeks 1,356 9.2
Education 50-59 weeks 1,018 8.8
High school 1,611 6.7 60-69 weeks 1,045 8.5
Some college 3,470 7.8 70-79 weeks 1,713 8.6
College 4,799 8.8 80-89 weeks 2,204 8.4
Graduate school 3,055 11.1 90-99 weeks 1,314 8.2
2008 Household income Credit card debt at time of entry survey
$20,000-$29,999 435 7.1 Less than $1,000 4,537 8.7
$30,000-$39,999 669 7.4 $1,000-$2,499 2,191 8.7
$40,000-$49,999 793 8.1 $2,500-$9,999 2,461 9.0
$50,000-$59,999 963 8.1 $10,000-$19,999 1,496 9.4
$60,000-$69,999 878 8.2 $20,000 or more 1,602 9.2
$70,000-$79,999 983 8.8 Savings at time of entry survey
$80,000-$89,999 1,244 9.2 Less than $10,000 6,129 9.8
$90,000-$99,999 1,453 9.7 $10,000-$24,999 2,312 9.4
$100,000-$149,999 3,556 9.2 $25,000-$49,999 1,661 8.6
$150,000+ 2,892 9.2 $50,000-$99,999 1,351 7.5
Home purchase price $100,000 or more 2,631 7.0
$100,000-$149,999 1,743 8.6 Sex
$150,000-$199,999 1,423 8.7 Male 7,885 9.2
$200,000-$299,999 2,457 9.4 Female 6,199 8.3
$300,000-$399,999 1,610 9.1
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Table 1.10: Baseline Bias by Characteristic
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Entire sample 2,196 18.6 Marital status
Age
30-34 134 23.7 Married 2,077 18.8
35-39 115 23.8
40-44 280 19.5 Unemployment duration
45-49 330 23.3 10-19 weeks 145 25.4
50-54 420 18.4 20-29 weeks 207 24.4
55-59 507 15.7 30-39 weeks 204 21.1
60-64 362 13.9 40-49 weeks 202 18.1
Education 50-59 weeks 137 18.8
High school 227 17.7 60-69 weeks 123 19.0
Some college 564 18.3 70-79 weeks 254 15.8
College 776 20.0 80-89 weeks 489 16.4
Graduate school 459 16.7 90-99 weeks 311 15.4
2008 Household income Credit card debt at time of entry survey
$20,000-$29,999 70 17.9 Less than $1,000 720 17.4
$30,000-$39,999 108 17.5 $1,000-$2,499 346 17.1
$40,000-$49,999 142 20.6 $2,500-$9,999 387 20.2
$50,000-$59,999 165 19.0 $10,000-$19,999 248 20.2
$60,000-$69,999 135 14.3 $20,000 or more 242 17.8
$70,000-$79,999 149 15.2 Savings at time of entry survey
$80,000-$89,999 180 16.1 Less than $10,000 955 19.1
$90,000-$99,999 230 18.9 $10,000-$24,999 347 20.5
$100,000-$149,999 560 20.5 $25,000-$49,999 262 19.0
$150,000+ 430 18.9 $50,000-$99,999 203 13.9
Home purchase price $100,000 or more 429 18.0
$100,000-$149,999 270 19.6 Sex
$150,000-$199,999 235 19.5 Male 1,233 18.7
$200,000-$299,999 376 20.0 Female 963 18.6
$300,000-$399,999 263 15.7
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CHAPTER 2
DO LATE-CAREER WAGES BOOST SOCIAL SECURITY MORE
FOR WOMEN THAN MEN? (WITH MATTHEW S. RUTLEDGE)
Delaying claiming Social Security benefits as long as possible - from age 62 to 70 -
increases benefits by 76 percent for workers born in 1943-1954. This feature is due
to the actuarial adjustment, which aims to ensure that the expected present value
of lifetime benefits for workers with average mortality varies little by claiming age1.
But monthly benefits can increase even more if late-career earnings displace zero-
or lower-earning years in their careers, thereby raising the average career earnings
used to calculate benefits. Women, in particular, stand to gain from longer careers,
as late-career earnings are more likely to replace years lost to childrearing and child
care.
This study uses Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data linked to Social Security
earnings records to quantify the extent to which late-career earnings increase workers’
benefits, focusing in particular on how women boost their benefits relative to men.
The results indicate that the total gain in Social Security income from delaying
claiming all the way to age 70 is 85 percent for the full sample - 76 percent of this
gain is from the actuarial adjustment alone (for individuals born in 1943 or later) and
9 percent from the increase in career average earnings. The portion attributable to
the increase in the career average earnings is substantial, because the vast majority
of individuals have late-career earnings that surpass their earnings earlier in their
careers. Women in particular have an opportunity to increase their benefits, because
1In part because the actuarial adjustment was based on mortality rates from the early 1960s,
delaying claiming - at least past the Early Entitlement Age of 62 - increases the present discounted
value of lifetime Social Security benefits for almost all groups (at least at current interest rates),
despite well-known differences in life expectancy by socioeconomic status (Shoven and Slavov (2014);
Sanzenbacher and Ramos-Mercado (2016)).
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nearly one-half of women have at least one year with no earnings among their top 35
years. Women’s Social Security benefits rise by 88 percent from delaying retirement
until age 70 (for all cohorts combined), compared with 82 percent for men. Even
delaying retirement by any one year (on average across ages) increases benefits by 8.6
percent for women, of which 1.6 percent is from replacing low-earning years. These
gains in monthly benefits are consistent among women, regardless of marital status,
education, and selection into late-career labor market participation.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section explains how late-career
earnings factor into the calculation of Social Security benefits and reviews the litera-
ture on the extent to which working at older ages increases benefits. A description of
the data and an outline of the empirical methodology follows. The subsequent section
presents the results, and the final section concludes that working longer helps older
individuals - especially women - substantially increase their Social Security income,
not just by delaying when they claim but also because late-career work supersedes
earlier, low-earning years.
1 Background on Social Security Benefits
Social Security retirement benefits are available to individuals who have spent a suffi-
ciently long time contributing payroll taxes into the Social Security system. Workers
are entitled to retirement benefits if they have accumulated 40 quarters of coverage -
where quarters of coverage accrue for each $1,260 in earnings (in 2016 dollars), up to
four per year - and have reached at least age 62.
The value of retirement benefits is based on workers’ Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME), which is the average of their highest 35 years of inflation-adjusted
wage-indexed earnings (divided by 12). The calculation includes zeros for workers
with fewer than 35 years of earnings. Workers with gaps in their careers, therefore,
stand to gain substantially from further years of work, as replacing zeros with even
fairly small full-time or full-year wages will greatly raise their AIMEs. Even workers
whose employment records do not have full years of zero earnings can increase their
AIMEs if they have low-earning years because they experienced long spells of non-
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employment, earned low hourly wages, or worked few hours per week.
Calculating the actual Social Security benefit requires two more steps. One is
converting the AIME to a Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), based on a progressive
benefit formula that allows low earners to keep a greater share of their AIME. If
late-career earnings increase the AIME by one dollar, the PIA increases by 90 cents
for workers with very low career earnings, but only by 15 cents for higher earners.
Therefore, the PIA formula reduces the potential return to working longer for workers
with higher career earnings.
The other step is the actuarial adjustment, which results in benefits that are less
than the PIA when workers claim their benefits before their Full Retirement Age
(FRA) and benefits that exceed the PIA when workers claim after the FRA. The
amount of the increase from delaying claiming by one extra year varies across birth
cohorts because of an increase over time in the FRA - which necessitates different
adjustments for early claiming - and because of the gradual actuarial increase in the
delayed retirement credit received by those who wait past their FRA. For our sample
of individuals born in 1931-1950, the gain from waiting an extra year - without any
increase in the PIA - is as small as 4.2 percent and as large as 8.3 percent (Appendix
Table 2.6)2.
Delayed retirement, therefore, has the potential to increase Social Security retire-
ment benefits in two ways. First, claiming later increases Social Security benefits
because of the actuarial adjustment. Second, if the worker can earn more than his
35th-best year to date - and especially if his 35th-best year had no earnings at all - his
AIME will increase, which, in turn increases his PIA and his retirement benefit.
2The minimum increase of 4.2 percent is for individuals born in 1931-1932 who postpone claiming
from their 69th birthdays (at which time they receive 120 percent of their PIA) to their 70th birthdays
(125 percent of their PIA; (125/120 - 1)*100 = 4.2 percent). The maximum increase is for individuals
born in 1937 or earlier who postpone claiming from 62 (80 percent of their PIA) to 63 (86.7 percent
of their PIA).
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2 Literature Review
Despite the obvious potential for increased Social Security benefits from additional
years of work, little is known about the impact of late-career earnings replacing the
zero- or low-earning years in a workers’ career. Most previous studies examining the
returns to late-career employment limit their analysis to stylized households with
consistent histories of earning near the average wage3. One example is Butrica et al.
(2008), who examine the potential gain for higher- and lower-earning households.
They characterize the potential gain from lower-income workers extending claiming
from 62 to 67 as modest but not insubstantial. But none of these studies use actual
earnings records that would account for the gaps that individuals often have in their
earnings records when they are out of work or experience periods of low earnings.
Furthermore, these studies generally do not decompose the gain in retirement benefits
into its two components: the actuarial adjustment and the increase in their career
average earnings (via a higher PIA).
To our knowledge, the only paper that uses actual workers’ earnings records to
examine the gains from working an extra year - Reznick et al. (2009) - focuses on
Social Security’s implicit rate of return. While their analysis reflects the net benefit of
working and paying payroll taxes for an additional year, their focus on the marginal
rate of return measure does not decompose the gain from working longer into the
actuarial adjustment and the replacement of low-earning years. Indeed, their analysis
does not address the simple but relevant question of how many years of such earnings
are replaced by continued work - and how women, in particular, benefit from delayed
retirement4.
Our paper focuses on the potential gain in retirement income - relative to pre-
retirement earnings - for women with gaps in their earnings histories. In contract
3See Butrica et al. (2004); Coile et al. (2002); Gokhale et al. (2002); and Koszegi and Rabin
(2007).
4Reznick et al. (2009) find that most women ages 62-65 in 2005 gain nothing from an extra year
of work because they are likely to receive the spousal benefit, or just a little more than the spousal
benefit, regardless of their earnings in that year. But they also find that the gains for women grow
considerably in later cohorts where spousal benefits are less prevalent.
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to the marginal internal rate of return on an additional year’s contributions, which
measures the relationship between additional taxes and additional benefits, the dollar
value of the benefit used here provides a direct measure of the effect of delay on
women’s well-being in the short run. The paper will present, to our knowledge,
the first decomposition of the increase in Social Security income into the actuarial
adjustment and the replacement of low-earning years using actual women’s earnings
histories.
The effect of Social Security on women’s retirement has changed greatly over the
past few decades. As women approach earnings parity with men, they will come to
rely less on spousal benefits (Wu et al. (2013)), and the benefit of delayed retirement
is likely only to increase. But little is known about how much Social Security income
they are currently leaving on the table. The findings of this study will inform assess-
ments of how delaying retirement has already increased benefits for women, and how
increases in their retirement ages will further help secure their household’s retirement
well-being.
3 Data and Methodology
This study uses the 1992-2012 HRS linked to U.S. Social Security Administration’s
Summary Earnings Records, which capture earnings histories (up to the taxable max-
imum) for most respondents in the HRS through 2013. Having complete earnings
histories allows for counterfactual calculations of what the AIME would have been if
respondents had stopped working earlier in their careers.
The sample for this analysis consists of HRS respondents born between 1931 and
1950, who reach age at least age 62 by the end of the HRS sample window and who
collect benefits on their own earnings records (i.e., no spousal benefits). Much of
the analysis is presented separately by gender. We also present separate analyses for
subsamples of women grouped by marital status and education. The marital status
analysis splits the sample between 1) women who have been married at least once
but never divorced (continually married); and 2) women who have been divorced
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(even if they subsequently remarried)5. Continually married women are more likely
to have gaps in their earnings records, because they took time off to raise children
or take care of elders, or because of preferences for a single-earner household. The
educational analysis splits the sample between women with a high school degree or
less and women with some college experience or more.
The aim of this project is to quantify the degree to which women who work longer
increase their Social Security benefits, relative to the gains for men. As part of this
analysis, we report the proportion of individuals who increased their PIAs by earning
more during any year of post-62 employment than their previous 35th-best year. The
analysis also quantifies the proportion of workers who replace zero-earning years with
earnings after age 62.
The primary outcome of interest is the increase in Social Security benefits at
each age between 63 and the last year of positive earnings, based on actual earnings
that year, and how that increase decomposes into PIA increases and gains from the
actuarial adjustment for delayed claiming.
One concern arises from self-selection into late-career earnings. It is reasonable to
presume that the respondents who continue working do so because they have higher
earnings potential. If this is true, it would create an upward bias on the gains from
late-career earnings. As a robustness exercise, we impute one extra year of earnings
for recently retired non-workers in order to estimate potential benefit increases for a
broader population.
In general, finding an adequate instrument to account for selection in a wage
regression is difficult. Appendix 2.B outlines one approach to account for selection
that exploits how the Bush tax cuts of the early 2000s had varying impacts by marital
status. We find this method to be sensitive to the earnings data and time frame used.
However, in scenarios where the tax laws serve as a powerful selection instrument,
predicted earnings with and without the selection adjustment are nearly identical.
We ultimately proceed with earnings predicted using a modified Mincerian earnings
5Widows are included in both groups, based on their marital histories.
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equation (Mincer (1958)) that includes controls for labor income taxes6.
A summary of the actual and imputed earnings data are reported in Table 2.1.
It shows that predicted earnings for workers of all ages are nearly identical to actual
earnings. Men’s earnings are slightly underestimated, while women’s earnings are
slightly overestimated. As expected, non-workers have lower predicted earnings. The
subsample of late-career workers ages 62-70 show predicted earnings that are slightly
less accurate7.
Table 2.1: Average Actual and Imputed Labor Earnings
All Men Women
Actual earnings
Workers - all ages $26,206.71 $31,320.80 $21,726.71
Workers - ages 62-70 $23,921.41 $29,033.59 $18,849.04
Predicted earnings - all ages
Workers $26,332.27 $29,994.34 $22,010.82
Non-workers $17,610.93 $20,482.58 $13,993.82
Predicted earnings - ages 62-70
Workers $22,770.68 $26,405.61 $17,336.62
Non-workers $17,106.10 $20,046.49 $13,317.72
Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked to SSA Re-
spondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings File. Tax liabilities calcu-
lated using TAXSIM9.
Social Security benefits are calculated at each age between 62 and 70 for every
individual. For each year after one’s 62nd birthday in which an individual had not yet
claimed Social Security benefits and had either positive actual or imputed earnings, we
calculate the gain in Social Security benefits from working that additional year8. To
determine how much of the increase in benefits is due to the extra year of earnings,
we also calculate the gain in the PIA from the additional year9. The remaining
6The Mincerian regression derives from the selection model presented in Appendix 2.B. Indepen-
dently, the literature on earnings functions has justified including labor income taxes as a control
by arguing that progressive taxes reduce the return to working. See, for example, Heckman et al.
(2008)
7We have attempted to correct these earnings, applying the smearing estimator developed in
Duan (1983). However, the estimator may not be appropriate in this situation where we have
predicted a change in logs rather than just a fitted log value.
8Benefits are calculated using the last full year of earnings before each person’s birthday. For
example, we calculate the benefits for an individual turning 63 in 2005 using earnings data ending
in 2004.
9When the PIA increases, the gain itself also rises because of the actuarial adjustment, and our
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difference in Social Security benefits from one year to the next is attributed to the
actuarial adjustment10. The gain in benefits is reported separately for each age, and
as an unweighted average for all workers at all ages; the average is calculated only for
workers with gains in their Social Security benefits and their PIAs.
We then construct the gain in Social Security benefits from delaying both claiming
and retirement from age 62 all the way to one’s 70th birthday. We assume that all
workers face the actuarial adjustment of the cohort born in 1943-1950, which gains
76 percent for delaying claiming until age 70. The portion of the gain in benefits
attributable to the PIA assumes a worker would get the average gain in the PIA
observed among all people working at each age11. The total increase in the benefit is
the increase in the actuarial adjustment plus the increase from late-career earnings.
4 Results
Table 2.2 reports the proportion of people working past age 62 whose earnings increase
their PIA, and the proportion whose earnings replace a zero-earnings year from earlier
in their career. The left panel indicates that, overall, about 91 percent of age-62-plus
workers increase their PIAs - that is, their recent earnings are more than the 35th-
highest year already on their record. Adding in the set of non-workers with imputed
earnings leads to a steady decline in the fraction of workers increasing their PIAs,
study attributes this compounded gain to the benefit of working an extra year. That is, the PIA at
age 63 is:
PIA63 = PIA62(1 + g)(1 + a) = PIA62(1 + g + a+ ga)
where PIA62 is the PIA calculated using only earnings before age 62; g is the percent gain in the PIA
from working at age 62; and a is the percent gain due to the actuarial adjustment. The calculated
gain in the PIA from working an extra year is (g+ ga). We attribute the interaction term ga to the
gain from working because the PIA would not have increased by ga if the individual did not work
(that is, if g = 0).
10The difference in PIA is taken before the PIA receives a Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA).
We do this because our goal is to capture the influence of an extra year of earnings rather than
the increase in PIA resulting from an inflation adjustment. The increase in Social Security benefit
attributed to the actuarial adjustment includes this COLA adjustment.
11An alternative approach would use the average observed increase for workers who actually delay
until age 70, but only 47 workers in our sample do so. Instead, we use the average increase in PIA
among individuals of each age; the sample decreases with age, but remains substantial into the late
60s. This assumption likely overstates the potential gain given that it is calculated from workers who
opted to delay retirement; these workers likely have greater earnings than individuals who opted to
retire earlier.
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which matches the intuition that these individuals had lower earnings potential and
smaller gains from late-career earnings. The share of older workers who replaced a
zero in their earnings record falls with age, as expected, but is quite high: about 30
percent of all workers increased their benefit at age 62 by replacing a zero-earning
year. This pattern persists when we incorporate imputed earnings for non-workers.
Table 2.2 also indicates that while the vast majority of both men and women are
able to increase their PIAs by working past age 62, only women have a substantial
amount of zeros to replace. Prior to age 63, only 15 percent of men still have a
zero-earning year among their top-35 years, but nearly one-half of all women do,
and slightly more women do if they have a high school degree or less. Women who
have ever divorced their spouses are slightly less likely to replace a zero-earning year,
perhaps because they have had more consistent work histories than women who have
been married for most of their working years12. Considering the imputed earnings
across gender, we find that the share of men increasing their PIAs falls as they
increase in age. This supports the idea that men have more complete and higher
earnings records.
Table 2.3 reports the one-year percentage gains in monthly Social Security re-
tirement benefits for people who work past age 62, and decomposes the gains into
the portion that derives from the PIA increasing and the portion that is due to the
change in the actuarial adjustment. The numbers at the bottom of each panel report
the share that is due to PIA increases (the second row divided by the third row). We
report the calculations for the full sample and separately by gender and for the two
subsamples of women defined by marital status or education.
On average, delaying claiming by any one year - not just from age 62 to 63,
but from any age to the next - increases benefits by 7 percent (first column) simply
through the actuarial adjustment13. Working an extra year raises benefits by another
12The high share of workers who can increase their benefits with further work is consistent with a
report from the U.S. Social Security Administration (2004), which shows that on average men have
6 years of zero earnings after age 22, and women have 13 years. Our calculations show that women
are less likely to have zero-earning years to replace at age 62 in more recent cohorts: 56 percent of
women born from 1931-1940 had a zero-earning year in their top 35 at age 62, compared with 39
percent of women born from 1941-1950.
13The average increase from the actuarial adjustment, 7 percent, is only slightly larger than the
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Table 2.3: One-Year Gain in Social Security Benefits from Working Ages 62+
Earnings Imputed
records earnings
Full sample
From actuarial adjustment 7.0% 7.1%
From PIA 1.2 1.3
Total increase 8.2 8.4
Share from PIA growth 14.2 15.5
Men
From actuarial adjustment 7.0% 7.2%
From PIA 0.8 0.9
Total increase 7.8 8.1
Share from PIA growth 9.9 11.1
Women
From actuarial adjustment 7.0% 7.1%
From PIA 1.6 1.7
Total increase 8.6 8.8
Share from PIA growth 18.4 19.3
Women, ever divorced
From actuarial adjustment 7.3% 7.3%
From PIA 1.6 1.6
Total increase 8.9 8.9
Share from PIA growth 18.3 18.0
Women, continually married
From actuarial adjustment 7.1% 7.1%
From PIA 1.8 1.9
Total increase 9.0 9.0
Share from PIA growth 20.6 21.1
Women, high school degree or less
From actuarial adjustment 6.8% 7.1%
From PIA 1.2 1.3
Total increase 8.1 8.4
Share from PIA growth 15.1 15.5
Women, some college or more
From actuarial adjustment 7.1% 7.2%
From PIA 1.2 1.3
Total increase 8.4 8.5
Share from PIA growth 14.5 15.3
Note: The actuarial adjustment is the one faced by the 1943-1950
birth cohorts. Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked
to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings File.
increase from delaying claiming before the FRA (6.67 percent), because most of the extra years
worked were at pre-FRA ages.
47
Table 2.4: Cumulative Gain in Social Security Benefits from Working Ages 62+
Earnings Imputed
records earnings
Full sample
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 8.9 9.4
Total increase 84.9 85.4
Share from PIA growth 10.5 11.0
Men
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 5.7 6.2
Total increase 81.7 82.2
Share from PIA growth 6.9 7.5
Women
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 12.4 12.6
Total increase 88.4 88.6
Share from PIA growth 14.0 14.2
Women, ever divorced
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 12.0 12.0
Total increase 88.0 88.0
Share from PIA growth 13.6 13.6
Women, continually married
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 13.9 14.0
Total increase 89.9 90.0
Share from PIA growth 15.5 15.6
Women, high school degree or less
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 12.6 12.9
Total increase 88.6 88.9
Share from PIA growth 14.2 14.5
Women, some college or more
From actuarial adjustment 76.0% 76.0%
From PIA 11.9 12.0
Total increase 87.9 88.0
Share from PIA growth 13.5 13.6
Note: The actuarial adjustment is the one faced by the 1943-1950
birth cohorts. Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked
to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings File.
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1.2 percent, because those years frequently replace low- or zero-earning years from
earlier in workers’ careers. The total increase in benefits from an extra year of work
(on average across ages) is 8.2 percent; about one-seventh of this increase is due
to increasing the career average earnings, with the remainder due to the actuarial
adjustment.
The next two panels in Table 2.3 show that women stand to gain more from raising
their PIAs: 1.6 percentage points, compared with 0.8 percentage points for men. This
result is sensible given that women have more low-earning years to replace. The total
gain to Social Security benefits for women is 8.6 percent, of which about one-fifth
derives from the PIA increase; for men, benefits rise by 7.8 percent, of which about
one-tenth derives from the PIA increase.
The bottom four panels of Table 2.3 present results separately for women by mar-
ital status and education. The actuarial adjustments here differ - not because the
actuarial adjustment formulas differ, but because most birth cohorts have different
actuarial adjustment rates, and the sub-samples by marital status and education have
different shares of each birth cohort. As a result, the actuarial adjustment is slightly
larger for women who have ever been divorced than for women who were continu-
ally married, probably because the rise in the divorce rate means that more divorced
women are in more recent cohorts, where the delayed retirement credit is more gener-
ous. Both ever-divorced and continually married women receive substantial increases
in their PIAs for one year of late-career earnings: an additional 1.6 percentage points
and 1.8 percentage points. The total increase in benefits from delaying retirement by
any one year is about 9 percent for both marital groups.
Educational attainment, like divorce, has also increased in later cohorts. There-
fore, better-educated women also see a slight advantage in the actuarial adjustment
over less-educated women. Late-career earnings increase for both better- and less-
educated women by 1.2 percent. But the total increase in benefits from delaying
retirement by any one year is 8.1 percent for women with a high school degree or less,
and 8.4 percent for women with at least some college experience.
Throughout Table 2.3, there are only negligible differences between outcomes using
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only actual earnings compared to outcomes incorporating imputed earnings. Gains
from the actuarial adjustment rise consistently as workers from more recent birth
cohorts are added to the sample.
Figure 2.1: Decomposition of the Increase in Social Security Retirement Benefits
from Delaying Retirement by One Year
Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary
Earnings File.
Figure 2.1 displays these results in a graph. The height of each bar is the overall
gain in the Social Security benefit from working one more year at some time after age
62. The bottom portion of the bar is the gain attributable to the actuarial adjustment
through delayed claiming, and the top portion is attributable to increasing the PIA
through delayed retirement. It is clear that the majority of the gain in benefits for
each group is from delayed claiming. Men do not substantially increase their career
average earnings, and the extra amount attributable to late-career earnings is larger
for each group of women.
Figure 2.2 examines the increase in retirement benefits at each age for women
(Panel A) and men (Panel B) and decomposes this gain into the portions attributable
to the actuarial adjustment (bottom) and the PIA increase (top). The boost to Social
Security benefits is largest between ages 63-65, at least in part because of the selection
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Figure 2.2: Decomposition of the Increase in Social Security Retirement Benefits
from Delaying Retirement by One Year, by Age
Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary
Earnings File.
effect: lower earners are more likely to drop out of the labor force closer to age 62,
leaving mostly higher earners - who have fewer low-earnings years to replace - working
closer to their FRA. After age 65, however, the retirement benefit boost starts to fade;
earnings at even older ages are not replacing the lower-earning, early-career years, as
evidenced by the shrinking boost coming from changes to the PIA (the top area).
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Table 2.5 shows similar patterns when imputed earnings are included.
Table 2.5: Decomposition of the Increase in Social Security Retirement Benefits
from Delaying Retirement by One Year, by Age
Age
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Earnings records
Men
From actuarial adj. 7.7% 8.0% 7.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.1% 5.7% 5.4%
From PIA 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Women
From actuarial adj. 7.5% 8.0% 7.4% 6.6% 6.7% 6.3% 5.9% 5.6%
From PIA 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
Imputed earnings
Men
From actuarial adj. 7.6% 8.0% 7.4% 6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 5.8% 5.5%
From PIA 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Women
From actuarial adj. 7.5% 8.0% 7.4% 6.6% 6.8% 6.3% 5.9% 5.6%
From PIA 2.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year
Summary Earnings File.
Figure 2.3, and Table 2.4, present the overall gain from delaying claiming and
retirement from age 62 all the way to one’s 70th birthday; the gain is decomposed
into the same two portions. The gain from delayed claiming is fixed at 76 percent,
the actuarial adjustment for the youngest cohorts in our sample (1943-1950). On
top of this increase, late-career earnings push up the PIA, which raises benefits by
an additional 8.9 percent, for a total increase of 84.9 percent. Women receive larger
increases from raising their PIAs: 12.4 percent, compared with 5.7 percent for men.
The extra boost from women’s late-career earnings results in a larger overall increase
of 88.4 percent, compared with 81.7 percent for men.
As expected, continually married women receive a slightly larger PIA increase
(13.9 percent) from delaying retirement to age 70 than divorced women (12 percent);
each has an 88-90 percent increase in benefits overall. Less-educated women, also as
expected, receive a larger increase from the PIA (12.6 percent) than better-educated
women (11.9 percent); the overall gain for both education groups is around 88 percent.
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Figure 2.3: Decomposition of the Increase in Social Security Retirement Benefits
from Delaying Retirement from Age 62 to 70
Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2012 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary
Earnings File.
5 Conclusion
The advantage of delaying one’s Social Security retirement benefit claim is well-
known: postponing claiming from age 62 until 70 increases monthly benefits by 76
percent even if delayed claimers never work beyond age 62. But claiming and retire-
ment tend to go hand-in-hand, so most older people who do not claim their benefits
keep working. Older workers further increase their Social Security benefits by replac-
ing low-earning years from early in their careers, thereby raising their career average
earnings based on their top 35 years of earnings.
The results in this study show that the gains in retirement benefits are substantial
not just because of the 76 percent bonus for delayed claiming. The overall increase
in Social Security benefits of working until 70 is 85 percent among recent cohorts of
individuals working after age 62 (and 85 percent across all cohorts), because of the
additional 9-percent boost from late-career earnings. Women are able to increase their
benefit by a total of 88 percent, because nearly one-half of women have at least one
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zero-earnings year in their top 35 years of earnings. There are similarly large gains for
women who are divorced and continually married, and better- and less-educated. The
gains are also appear robust to the selection into late-career labor force participation.
These findings emphasize the effectiveness of delaying one’s retirement in shoring
up the retirement security of vulnerable workers. Working longer: allows older in-
dividuals to postpone drawing down their retirement saving; permits them to save
longer or accumulate more pension benefits; makes them more likely to maintain their
employer-sponsored health insurance; and may have positive effects on their mental
and cognitive health (Meyer and Sullivan (2008)). This study’s results suggest that
policies aimed at increasing employment at older ages - through reforms to Social
Security and Medicare, or through tax credits that reduce the cost of employing older
workers - also increase Social Security benefits. That increase arises not only from
the delayed retirement credit but also because most workers earn more at the end of
their careers.
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APPENDIX
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2.A Actuarial Adjustments to Social Security Benefits
Table 2.6: Actuarial Adjustments to Social Security Retirement Benefits from
Delayed Claiming, by Age and Cohort
Claiming age Implied
Birth 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 gain incohort benefits
1943+ Percent of PIA 75.0 80.0 86.7 93.3 100.0 108.0 116.0 124.0 132.0 76
Actuarial adj. 5.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Y-o-Y increase 6.7 8.3 7.7 7.1 8.0 7.4 6.9 6.5
Cum. increase 6.7 15.6 24.4 33.3 44.0 54.7 65.3 76.0
1942 Percent of PIA 75.8 81.1 87.8 94.4 101.3 108.8 116.3 123.8 131.3 73.1
Actuarial adj. 5.3 6.7 6.7 6.8 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Y-o-Y increase 7.0 8.2 7.6 7.2 7.4 6.9 6.5 6.1
Cum. increase 7.0 15.8 24.5 33.5 43.4 53.3 63.2 73.1
1941 Percent of PIA 76.7 82.2 88.9 95.6 102.5 110.0 117.5 125.0 132.5 72.8
Actuarial adj. 5.6 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Y-o-y increase 7.2 8.1 7.5 7.3 7.3 6.8 6.4 6.0
Cum. increase 7.2 15.9 24.6 33.7 43.5 53.3 63.0 72.8
1940 Percent of PIA 77.5 83.3 90.0 96.7 103.5 110.5 117.5 124.5 131.5 69.7
Actuarial adj. 5.8 6.7 6.7 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Y-o-Y increase 7.5 8.0 7.4 7.1 6.8 6.3 6.0 5.6
Cum. increase 7.5 16.1 24.7 33.5 42.6 51.6 60.6 69.7
1939 Percent of PIA 78.3 84.4 91.1 97.8 104.7 111.7 118.7 125.7 132.7 69.4
Actuarial adj. 6.1 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Y-o-Y increase 7.8 7.9 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.6
Cum. increase 7.8 16.3 24.8 33.6 42.6 51.5 60.4 69.4
1938 Percent of PIA 79.2 85.6 92.2 98.9 105.4 111.9 118.4 124.9 131.4 66.0
Actuarial adj. 6.4 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Y-o-Y increase 8.1 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.5 5.2
Cum. increase 8.1 16.5 24.9 33.2 41.4 49.6 57.8 66.0
1937 Percent of PIA 80.0 86.7 93.3 100.0 106.5 113.0 119.5 126.0 132.5 65.6
Actuarial adj. 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Y-o-Y increase 8.3 7.7 7.1 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.2
Cum. increase 8.3 16.7 25.0 33.1 41.3 49.4 57.5 65.6
1935-36 Percent of PIA 80.0 86.7 93.3 100.0 106.0 112.0 118.0 124.0 130.0 62.5
Actuarial adj. 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Y-o-Y increase 8.3 7.7 7.1 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.1 4.8
Cum. increase 8.3 16.7 25.0 32.5 40.0 47.5 55.0 62.5
1933-34 Percent of PIA 80.0 86.7 93.3 100.0 105.5 111.0 116.5 122.0 127.5 59.4
Actuarial adj. 6.7 6.7 6.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Y-o-Y increase 8.3 7.7 7.1 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.5
Cum. increase 8.3 16.7 25.0 31.9 38.8 45.6 52.5 59.4
1931-32 Percent of PIA 80.0 86.7 93.3 100.0 105.0 110.0 115.0 120.0 125.0 56.3
Actuarial adj. 6.7 6.7 6.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Y-o-Y increase 8.3 7.7 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.2
Cum. increase 8.3 16.7 25.0 31.3 37.5 43.8 50.0 56.3
Source: U.S. Social Security Administration.
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2.B Mincerian Earnings Regression
To get a more complete picture of the Social Security benefit gains from late-career
earnings, it is useful to include estimates of the potential gains for late-career non-
workers. Calculating the foregone Social Security benefit increases requires forming
a prediction of unobserved earnings for non-workers.
Work has been done to impute earnings for non-workers in the labor supply liter-
ature. Several cross-sectional studies have simply imputed earnings for non-workers
using observable covariates14. In these exercises, it is assumed that controlling for
observable characteristics renders workers and non-workers identical. Studies predict
labor earnings L using a vector of covariates X.
ln(Li) = α +Xiβ + i (2.1)
As an extension of this method, other authors have accounted for selection bias
by using a Heckman (1979) model. In these cases, an extensive-margin selection
equation is estimated in order to derive an inverse Mills ratio to add to equation
(2.1). The extensive-margin equation requires an instrument for selection, which is
typically the number of preschool-aged children15. Alpert and Powell (2012) outline
how this instrument poses two problems. First, it may not be exogenous. While
the number of preschool-aged children would affect labor force participation, it also
could separately affect labor earnings16. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this
instrument is unlikely to be very strong for the older workers considered in this study.
This paper explores an alternative instrument for selection introduced in Alpert
and Powell (2012) and Alpert and Powell (2016). Exploiting changes in tax laws,
this method uses the varying impacts of tax laws on married and single workers with
14See, for example, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Blau and Kahn (2007), and Gelber and Mitchell
(2012).
15See, for example, Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Eissa et al. (2008), and Gelber and Mitchell (2012).
16Specifically, Alpert and Powell (2012) argue that workers with preschool-aged children might
differ from workers without pre-school aged children along unobservable dimensions such as intensive
labor supply preferences or productivity.
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different levels of initial income17. One feature of this method that differs from most
of the literature is the use of panel data. In addition to the HRS and Summary
Earning Records, this part of the paper utilizes NBER’s Taxsim program (Feenberg
and Coutts (1993)) to calculate tax rates and tax liabilities.
The underlying theoretical framework in Alpert and Powell (2016) follows from
Eissa et al. (2008). Individual workers maximize utility by choosing consumption and
labor, subject to a budget constraint. Workers incur a cost from working, and the
budget constraint contains labor and non-labor income, as well as a total tax liability.
max
c,L
U(c, L)− I(L > 0)q s.t. c = L+ y0 − T [L+ y0] (2.2)
where c is consumption, L is labor earnings, y0 is non-labor income, and y = L+ y0
is total income. T [y] is total tax liability, which is non-linear in total income, and
q is the cost of working. Defining the derivative of T as the marginal tax rate τ ,
the first-order conditions show that changes in labor income depend upon changes in
the marginal net-of-tax rate (1 − τ) and changes in after-tax total income y − T [y].
Therefore, the model imputes changes in labor earnings according to the intensive
labor supply equation:
∆ln(Li,t) = αt +X
′
itδ + β
I∆ln(1− τi,t) + θI∆ln(yit − Tit[yit]) + ∆i,t (2.3)
where X is a vector of observable characteristics that includes measures of initial in-
come, education, age and marital status. After accounting for after-tax total income,
the coefficient βI is interpreted as a compensated elasticity. It should be positive,
showing that there is a positive substitution effect and that a higher cost of leisure
leads to increased labor earnings through increased work hours.
At the interior solution for the consumer, we can consider their utility from work-
ing versus their utility from not working. At the point where this individual is indif-
17A more detailed explanation of the variation in tax laws being exploited can be found in Alpert
and Powell (2012).
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ferent:
U(L+ y0 − T [L+ y0], L)− q = U(y0 − T [y0], 0) (2.4)
Implicitly, the decision to work depends upon the worker’s after-tax total income
y−T [y], their after-tax non-labor income y0−T [y0], and their labor earnings. Differ-
entiating this indifference expression shows that the worker’s labor force participation
depends upon changes in the tax schedule. The extensive margin labor force partici-
pation decision can be estimated using the regression:
P (Worki,t = 1) = F (φt +X
′
itγ + β
E∆ln(yit − Tit[yit])
+ θE∆ln(y0it − T [y0it]) + ρE∆ln(Lit) + νit) (2.5)
The coefficient βE is the compensated elasticity on the extensive margin and is ex-
pected to be positive. After accounting for after-tax non-labor income and labor earn-
ings, it is capturing the idea that higher after-tax labor earnings should encourage
more labor force participation. Higher after-tax non-labor income should discourage
work, so θE should be negative18. Similarly, after holding constant after-tax total
income, ρE illustrates the disutility from extra work and should be negative.
There are several identification problems in estimating equations (2.3) and (2.5).
Both equations can only be estimated using workers in a given period, since Lit is un-
observed for non-workers. Also, in equation (2.3), labor earnings determine tax rates
and tax liabilities through the tax schedule. Similarly, equation (2.5) includes after-
tax non-labor income, which is potentially dependent upon labor force participation.
Therefore, standard estimation techniques will provide biased estimates.
We create three tax-related instruments to take advantage of the exogenous shocks
to tax variables: measures of the marginal net-of-tax rate, after-tax income, and after-
tax labor income. Variation comes from the interaction of the tax legislation changes,
initial income levels, and marital status. For each individual, we use the HRS income,
asset and demographic variables combined with the earnings records to compute tax
liabilities and rates for initial year t. Holding all individual variables constant, we
18By the same reasoning, using after-tax labor income should result in a positive coefficient.
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then calculate tax liabilities and rates using the tax laws from year t+219. In order to
take advantage of the differential effects that tax changes have on married and single
filers, these steps are then repeated for each individual under the assumption every
person is single20. All tax liabilities and rates are calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM.
The result is the following set of instruments:
∆ln(1− τ)−∆ln(1− τ¯) (2.6)
∆ln(z − T (z))−∆ln(z − T¯ (z)) (2.7)
∆ln(L− (Tw − T nw))−∆ln(L− (T¯w − T¯ nw)) (2.8)
where τ¯ is the marginal tax rate for a single filer and T¯ is the tax liability for a single
filer. Tw and T nw are total tax liabilities for individuals when then have worked and
when they have not worked, and they are assumed to be equal for non-workers in the
data. Having the instruments defined in differences should reduce the bias that may
occur across households that face different tax changes. These instruments also vary
independently from one another. Marginal tax rates vary when tax legislation moves
a kink point in the nonlinear tax schedule. After-tax income varies from tax changes
based on the distance from kink points in the nonlinear tax schedule. After-tax labor
income varies based on variation in non-labor income.
The theoretical prediction is that the after-tax labor income instrument in (2.8)
is an appropriate instrument for selection into the intensive labor supply equation
(2.3). Holding constant the variation in marginal tax rates and total after-tax income,
changes in labor tax liability will serve as an exogenous shock to employment. In
order for this instrument to be valid, the labor force participation decision must be
correlated with labor tax changes.
All estimation is done for the entire sample, as well as separately by gender. A
vector of covariates is included in all estimation. Each individual i at time t is placed
in a cell based on age, education and marital status. There are 60 cells, coming
19We need to use t+ 2 rather than t+ 1 because HRS waves are only collected every other year.
20Any spousal earnings are added into other income.
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from two marital statuses (married or single), five education categories (less than
high school, GED, high school graduate, some college, college graduate), and six age
groups (55-60, 61-62, 63-64, 65-67, 68-69, 70+). Indicator variables are also based
on spousal age (under 55, 55-60, 61-62, 63-64, 65-67, 68-69, 70+) and education.
Finally, there are measures of initial labor income Lit, spousal labor income and total
household income, each interacted with a dummy variable for “married at time t"
so that initial income has different effects based on marital status. Estimates using
self-reported earnings utilize waves of the HRS covering 2000-2014, while results using
SSA administrative data only cover 2000-2012.
The first step is to estimate a reduced-form version of equation (2.5). It contains
all exogenous variables, including all three instruments:
P (Worki,t+1 = 1) = F (φt +X
′
itγ + β1[∆ln(1− τ)−∆ln(1− τ¯)]it
+ β2[∆ln(y − T (y))−∆ln(y − T¯ (y))]it
+ β3[∆ln(L− (Tw − T nw))−∆ln(L− (T¯w − T¯ nw))]it + ηit) (2.9)
A probit regression is estimated for (2.9), and predictions from this estimation are
then used to compute an inverse Mills ratio to use as an adjustment for selection in
the intensive labor supply equation.
Table 2.7 shows the results from the selection equation using self-reported earn-
ings and the SSA earnings file. The first two columns show that the instrument
is correlated with employment probabilities for the entire self-reported sample and
the subsample of self-reported earnings among men. However, column three shows
that this instrument is not very good for the subsample of women, which is this
paper’s primary demographic of interest. The right panel of the table provides re-
sults using the administrative SSA data. Switching to the administrative data yields
opposite results. The instrument is negatively correlated with employment probabil-
ities. This result is counter to the expected influence of labor earnings on labor force
participation. Further evaluation of this instrument’s ability to predict labor force
participation showed that the self-reported earnings results depend heavily upon the
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Table 2.7: Selection Equation, Reduced Form
Dependent Variable: Self-reported SSA earnings
I(Employed) All Men Women All Men Women
All ages
∆ln(L− (T¯w − T¯nw)) 1.364*** 2.154*** 0.766 -1.159*** -0.946* -1.343***
(0.386) (0.586) (0.512) (0.353) (0.496) (0.514)
Observations 37,933 19,298 18,634 28,260 15,323 12,937
Ages 55-74
∆ln(L− (T¯w − T¯nw)) 1.280*** 2.377*** 0.323 -1.542*** -1.352** -1.692***
(0.453) (0.688) (0.606) (0.420) (0.588) (0.612)
Observations 26,186 14,412 11,771 20,286 11,343 8,943
Ages 62-70
∆ln(L− (T¯w − T¯nw)) 1.582** 2.716*** 0.479 -1.689*** -2.146*** -1.123
(0.667) (0.910) (0.993) (0.603) (0.826) (0.934)
Observations 9,839 5,734 4,103 9,375 5,475 3,899
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Other variables included: predicted change
in log of marginal net-of-tax rate; predicted change in log of after-tax income; year dum-
mies; interactions for (age group X education X initial marital status); interactions based
on (spousal age group X spousal education). Initial income controls include initial labor
income, spousal labor income, and total income by marital status. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at individual level. Source: Health and Retire-
ment Study, 2000-2014 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings File.
TAXSIM9 used to find estimates for tax liabilities.
HRS waves used in estimation.
Given the inconsistency of these results, we decided to assume workers and non-
workers are identical after controlling for observables. This allows us to estimate
a Mincerian earnings regression without adjusting for selection. This decision in
reinforced by the results in Table 2.8. The best set of results coming from the first
stage of the selection estimation used data from 2000-2014 with self-reported earnings.
If we carry through the estimation process, the resulting predicted earnings are not
much different when accounting for the selection bias. Therefore, it appears selection
is not a large source of bias.
Estimating the Mincerian earnings equation, in the form derived in this Appendix,
still requires instrumental variables. The marginal tax rate and the tax liability will
be mechanically defined by the labor earnings of workers. We estimate equation (2.3)
using the instruments created for the marginal net-of-tax rate and after-tax total
income. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Table 2.9 shows the results from the first stage of the intensive labor supply
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Table 2.8: Average Predicted Labor Income
All Men Women
Actual average earnings of workers - all ages $46,462.90 $55,729.23 $37,248.74
Actual average earnings of workers - ages 55-74 $47,200.37 $56,580.25 $36,478.73
Actual average earnings of workers - ages 62-70 $40,531.02 $47,589.91 $31,398.60
Selection All Men Women
Adjustment: None Heckman None Heckman None Heckman
Predicted Labor Income Using All Ages
Workers $39,751.60 $39,729.85 $45,302.45 $45,272.40 $34,161.35 $34,147.96
Non-Workers $28,156.58 $28,125.98 $31,905.03 $31,877.70 $23,921.82 $23,887.56
Predicted Labor Income Using Ages 55-74
Workers $37,930.12 $37,855.51 $43,059.52 $42,963.83 $31,664.57 $31,615.69
Non-Workers $28,089.14 $27,986.93 $32,268.53 $32,163.69 $22,944.14 $22,845.19
Predicted Labor Income Using Ages 62-70
Workers $29,919.14 $29,936.34 $33,735.20 $33,750.53 $24,523.88 $24,543.73
Non-Workers $24,344.62 $24,377.45 $28,058.12 $28,088.26 $19,279.31 $19,315.81
Predicted Labor Income Using All Ages, by Gender
Workers $47,161.01 $47,027.47 $31,988.87 $32,051.73
Non-Workers $33,341.65 $33,147.03 $22,358.60 $22,474.81
Predicted Labor Income Using Ages 55-74, by Gender
Workers $44,553.20 $44,425.99 $29,674.92 $29,692.18
Non-Workers $33,475.55 $33,248.44 $21,659.11 $21,676.84
Predicted Labor Income Using Ages 62-70, by Gender
Workers $35,253.56 $35,120.92 $23,218.58 $23,304.36
Non-Workers $29,247.06 $29,021.63 $18,701.32 $19,230.06
Source: Health and Retirement Study, 2000-2014 using TAXSIM9 estimates for tax liabilities.
equation when the sample is workers of all ages. The results suggest that there is a
strong relationship between the instruments and each endogenous variable.
Table 2.10 shows the results from the second stage of the intensive labor supply
equation. The compensated elasticity coefficient on the marginal net-of-tax rate is
positive, but insignificant, matching expectations. Using the coefficients from this es-
timation, we can predict the labor income for workers and non-workers. The predicted
changes in earnings are transformed to estimate next-period earnings using:
Lˆi,t+1 = exp(ln(Lit) + ln(Li,t+1)− ln(Lit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Predicted
) (9)
Results from this transformation are reported in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.9: Intensive Labor Supply Equation, First Stage
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(1-MTR) ∆ ln(After-Tax Income)
All (N=27,794)
Predicted ∆ ln(1-MTR) 0.521*** 0.001
(0.016) (0.001)
Predicted ∆ ln(After-Tax Income) 0.438*** 1.068***
(0.038) (0.014)
Men (N=13,365)
Predicted ∆ ln(1-MTR) 0.545*** 0.002
(0.024) (0.001)
Predicted ∆ ln(After-Tax Income) 0.448*** 1.120***
(0.057) (0.023)
Women (N=11,429)
Predicted ∆ ln(1-MTR) 0.495*** -0.001
(0.023) (0.001)
Predicted ∆ ln(After-Tax Income) 0.495*** 1.039***
(0.051) (0.017)
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Other variables included: year dummies;
interactions for (age group X education X initial marital status); interactions based on
(spousal age group X spousal education). Initial income controls include initial labor
income, spousal labor income, and total income by marital status. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at individual level. Source: Health and Retire-
ment Study, 2000-2012 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings File.
TAXSIM9 used to find estimates for tax liabilities.
Table 2.10: Intensive Labor Supply Equation, 2SLS
Dependent Variable:
∆ ln(Labor Income) All Men Women
∆ ln(1-MTR) 0.213 0.321 0.131
(0.162) (0.232) (0.225)
∆ ln(After-Tax Income) -2.595*** -3.493*** -1.897***
(0.734) (1.092) (0.967)
Observations 24,794 13,365 11,429
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Other variables included: year
dummies; interactions for (age group X education X initial marital status);
interactions based on (spousal age group X spousal education). Initial
income controls include initial labor income, spousal labor income, and
total income by marital status. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at individual level. Source: Health and Retirement Study,
2000-2012 linked to SSA Respondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings File.
TAXSIM9 used to find estimates for tax liabilities.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXTENSIONS
ON WORKER JOB-SEARCH BEHAVIOR
The expected effects of unemployment insurance (UI) have been postulated by econ-
omists for decades. UI Benefits provide consumption-smoothing liquidity to unem-
ployed workers at the risk of encouraging those same workers to extend their unem-
ployment spells. In a variety of studies across a variety of settings, economists have
established that the presence of UI benefits does, in fact, lead to increases in unem-
ployment duration. However, the exact mechanism by which unemployment persists
is rarely addressed. For example, does an unemployed worker interpret an extension
of UI benefits as an opportunity to find a better match in the labor market, or as a
signal that it is less likely they will find a job at all? This study sheds light on this
question.
Theoretical models of UI, starting with Mortensen (1977), frame the decision of
unemployed workers around two key choices. First, workers must choose a reservation
wage, which is the lowest wage a worker would accept in a job offer to leave unem-
ployment. Second, workers can adjust the amount of time they spend searching for a
job. According to this framework, increasing either the amount of weekly UI benefits
or the length of time workers receive UI benefits should result in making unemploy-
ment more attractive. With a stronger desire to remain unemployed, workers should
set higher reservation wages and exert lower search effort. An alternative response
from unemployed workers would be interpreting longer or more generous benefits as
a signal that they should expect to remain unemployed longer. Viewed as bad news,
workers may set lower reservation wages and exert more search effort to increase the
chances they find an acceptable job.
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I use the Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey (SUWNJ) to address
whether workers generally see extended UI benefits as an opportunity to improve
their labor market outcome or as a discouraging signal. The SUWNJ has several
distinct advantages. First, it is a weekly, longitudinal survey that collects information
from the same group of respondents for up to 24 weeks. The sample is completely
composed of unemployed workers collecting UI benefits, which is the group of interest.
Second, it collects detailed information about the job search activity of unemployed
workers and directly asks workers about their reservation wages. Finally, the survey
period overlaps with the November 6, 2009 extension of federal UI benefits from 76
to 99 weeks. This change in UI benefit duration can be exploited to determine the
behavioral response of unemployed workers.
In order to test these theoretical predictions, I employ two separate approaches.
As an initial step, I conduct hypothesis tests to evaluate whether the mean reservation
wage rose or the mean search effort fell after the UI extension. Results are reported for
paired samples, comparing data from the last survey a respondent completed before
the extension to the first survey the same respondent completed after the extension.
Due to the weekly nature of the data, tests are also run comparing the cross-sectional
means within a equal-sized windows before and after the UI extension. A second
approach uses methods developed in the finance event study literature and accounts
for the possibility that there is a trend in reservation wages or search effort over the
unemployment spell. The method is slightly modified to account for the timing of
the SUWNJ data.
The results of this paper suggest that there is an absolute increase in reservation
wages following the November 2009 UI extension. This increase takes time to appear
in the reported reservation wages for individual workers. Search effort among un-
employed workers falls in both absolute and relative terms. That is, average search
effort is lower after the UI extension, and it is lower than would be expected along
the regular path of search effort over an unemployment spell.
While the SUWNJ has been used by researchers to evaluate the job search behavior
and reservation wages of unemployed workers, this is the first study using the dataset
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to examine how these behaviors respond to an extension of UI benefits. Compared
with other studies that evaluate behavioral responses to UI extensions, the SUWNJ
has the advantage of providing individual-level results rather than cross-sectional
results. In the context of the search effort literature, it is also has the advantage of
reporting the impact of UI extensions on total search effort while unemployed rather
than just the impact on unemployment duration. To my knowledge, this is also the
first paper within the UI literature to apply event study methods to this UI context.
The next section provides a review of the existing literature on the impact of UI
benefits on worker behavior. Section 2 outlines a model of job search presented in
Mortensen (1977) to highlight the expected empirical results. The data are described
in section 3 and the methodological approach to testing the theoretical implications
is presented in section 4. All results are presented in section 5 before the conclusion.
1 Literature Review
Empirical evidence on how unemployed workers respond to unemployment insurance
benefits is scarce. In this paper, the two main behavioral responses are reservation
wages and search effort. Measurement of both variables is often difficult, and few data
sources are able to provide repeated observations over the duration of unemployment.
Previous work on reservation wages is largely subject to two data limitations.
First, most self-reported reservation wages are cross-sectional. As a result, the sam-
ple of unemployed workers changes over time. This leads to potentially biased results
because the distribution of unemployment durations within the sample is also chang-
ing. Second, many surveys do not directly elicit reservation wages from respondents.
Rather, much of the empirical evidence on reservation wages relies upon the newly
accepted wage reported by previously unemployed workers1. The Survey of Unem-
ployed Workers in New Jersey (SUWNJ) resolves both of these data issues by having
1In some cases, newly accepted wages may be a preferred measure. There is a large literature
on the inability of economic agents to accurately report their true information and expectations.
See, for example, Bound and Krueger (1991) for evidence of this problem related to self-reported
earnings and Manski (2004) for evidence of this problem related to subjective expectations. When
a wage below the reported reservation wage is accepted, this may reveal more information about the
individual’s true reservation wage.
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respondents complete weekly surveys in which they directly report their reservation
wage.
Authors generally focus on estimating an elasticity of reservation wages with re-
spect to UI benefits, as that parameter appears in the Shimer and Werning (2007) for-
mula for optimal UI benefits. In particular, Shimer and Werning showed that worker
welfare can be completely summarized in their reservation wage. Larger reservation
wage elasticities, in this formulation, suggest that welfare may be improved through
higher UI benefits. Intuitively, smaller increases in UI benefits could lead to larger
increases in reservation wages, and subsequently higher accepted wages when new job
matches are found.
Previous empirical work studying cross-sectional self-reported reservation wages
show inconsistent responses to UI benefit extensions. For example, Feldstein and
Poterba (1984) find a large elasticity of reservation wages with respect to UI benefits
using a supplemental questionnaire from the 1976 Current Population Survey. In
contrast, DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) show that unemployed workers who receive
and do not receive UI benefits report similar reservation wages in both the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. More
recently, Le Barbanchon et al. (2018) conclude they cannot reject the hypothesis that
the elasticity of reservation wages with respect to UI benefit duration is zero using
French data.
Newer research has studied accepted wages as a proxy for reservation wages. Re-
sults in this set of research are more consistent, showing no significant impact of UI
benefits on new wages. These results also appear to be fairly widespread, as Nekoei
and Weber (2017) and Chetty et al. (2007a) find evidence in Austria and Schmieder
et al. (2013) use German data. Accepted post-employment wages likely create a
more reasonable upper bound for reservation wages, but they also confound reser-
vation wages with the potential wage offer distribution. Additionally, these results
are often plagued with selection issues because not all workers receive and accept job
offers. Both of these issues are overcome using the SUWNJ since it is longitudinal
and contains direct measurement of reservation wages.
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Adding to this literature are Krueger and Mueller (2016), who also use the SUWNJ.
They contribute to the cross-sectional papers that use self-reported reservation wages,
confirming a smaller and insignificant elasticity of reservation wages with respect to
UI benefits. Krueger and Mueller (2016) also report results of fixed effects estimates
of reservation wages on unemployment duration, showing an insignificant change in
reservation wages after the November 2009 UI extension. In contrast to Krueger and
Mueller (2016), who use regression analysis over the entire survey period to produce
their result, this paper uses testing of means and modified event study analysis to
study how workers adjust their reservation wages in response to an extension of UI
benefits in short windows immediately following the extension announcement.
Regarding the impact of UI benefits on job search effort, much of the research
addressing the relationship ultimately reports the relationship between UI benefits
and unemployment duration2. The general results suggest that UI extensions re-
sult in moderately longer unemployment spells, which occur through a channel of
decreased search effort around the extension. On average, roughly 10 extra weeks
of unemployment benefits are estimated to extend unemployment durations by 1-2
weeks.
More closely related to this study are the worker-level search effort adjustments.
Current papers on this matter highlight the pattern of search effort over an unem-
ployment spell. Krueger and Mueller (2011) use the SUWNJ to show that search
effort falls over the unemployment spell. The Krueger and Mueller (2011) result is
expanded by Potter (2018), who shows that the pattern of search effort can be ex-
plained by workers learning about the job arrival process. These papers corroborate
evidence in the Current Population Survey and American Time Use Survey, which
Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama et al. (2014) show capture a hump-shaped pattern of
search effort over the unemployment spell3. In all papers, the results indicate that
2For example, see Valletta (2014), Rothstein (2011), Mas and Johnston (2018), Schmieder et al.
(2012) or Farber and Valletta (2015)
3These results are in opposition to those found in DellaVigna et al. (2017), in which Hungarian
workers ramp up search just before and just after changes in their UI benefit level. Using reference-
dependent utility, they argue that workers search very hard just before a fall in their UI benefit
level, and continue to search hard for a period while they adjust to lower levels of consumption.
69
search effort falls with unsuccessful search, lending credence to the idea of discouraged
workers. The paper presented here, however, is the first to report the individual-level
search effort response to UI extensions.
2 Model
Krueger and Mueller (2016) present a simple model of reservation wages. I modify
their model to include endogenous search effort, as in Mortensen (1977). In this
simplified model, unemployed workers are assumed to have no savings but can receive
a maximum of T weeks of unemployment benefits b. Job offers arrive at rate λ ∗ s(t),
which depends on the amount of search effort, s(t) put forth by the worker when they
have t more weeks of UI benfits remaining. Offers have wages w that are drawn from
a distribution of wages F (w). With t more weeks of unemployment benefits b, the
value function for an unemployed worker is:
U(t) = max
R(t),s(t)
[
u(b(t), 1− s(t)) + β
[
U(t− 1)
+ λ ∗ s(t)
∫
R
(W (x,m = 0)− U(t− 1))dF (x)
]]
(3.1)
where u(·) is the worker’s flow utility function, which takes as inputs the worker’s
income and time devoted to leisure. For unemployed workers who qualify for unem-
ployment benefits, income is the UI benefit and leisure is the fraction of the unit-length
period that is not spent searching for a job. The worker discounts by factor β, and
the value of starting a job paying wage w > R(t) is W (w,m = 0) for new workers.
In this value function, m is the number of weeks employed - so new workers are
0 months employed - which influences the value of a job by determining the amount
of time until a new unemployment claim can be filed. The longer is the qualification
period for new-claim eligibility, the more rigid reservation wages are expected to
be over unemployment duration. This is because the value of a new job would be
significantly lower for longer qualification periods.
An increase in either the benefit b or the benefit period T not only increases the
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value of being currently unemployed, but also increases the value of being laid off
in the future. As an unemployed worker nears the end of her benefit eligibility, the
second effect begins to dominate and the value of becoming employed increases. This,
as optimality conditions will demonstrate, leads to lower reservation wages and higher
search effort.
The value function for an employed worker on a job paying wage w can take two
forms, one where the worker has not qualified for UI benefits and one where the
worker has qualified. If a worker qualifies for UI benefits after m¯ months, then her
value function while unqualified (m < m¯) but earning wage w is:
W (w,m) = max
s(t)
[
u(w, l0 − s(t)) + β
[
(1− δ)W (w,m+ 1) + δU(0)
+ λ ∗ s(t)(1− δ)
∫
w
(W (x,m+ 1)−W (w,m+ 1))dF (x)
]]
(3.2)
and while qualified (m ≥ m¯) is:
W (w, m¯) = max
s(t)
[
u(w, l0 − s(t)) + β
[
(1− δ)W (w, m¯) + δU(T )
+ λ ∗ s(t)(1− δ)
∫
w
(W (x, m¯)−W (w, m¯))dF (x)
]]
(3.3)
where the exogenous separation probability is δ and l0 represents the remaining time
outside of work that can be split between leisure and job search.
Equation 3.1 implies the optimal choice of reservation wage for an unemployed
worker is defined by:
W (R(t),m = 0) = U(t− 1) (3.4)
Intuitively, an unemployed worker sets her reservation wage such that the value
of starting a job at that reservation wage is equivalent to the value of collecting t− 1
more periods of UI benefits while unemployed. Naturally, as unemployed workers
near the exhaustion of UI benefits, the value of remaining unemployed declines and
the reservation wage is predicted to decline. If an extension of benefits is granted, the
worker has a incentive to delay the decrease in reservation wage. This effect should
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be particularly prominent for workers nearing the end of their benefit eligibility prior
to the extension.
Equation 3.1 also implies the optimal choice of search effort for an unemployed
worker:
∂u(b, 1− s)
∂(1− s) = λ
∫
R
(W (x,m = 0)− U(t− 1))dF (x) (3.5)
Here, the unemployed worker searches until the cost of search - the marginal
utility of foregone leisure - is equal to the marginal return in indirect utility from
search time. The marginal return to search depends critically on the gap between
the value of becoming employed and the value of remaining unemployed. Since the
value of remaining unemployed falls as the remaining UI eligibility falls, the marginal
return to search grows nears exhaustion. Therefore, unemployed workers increase
their search effort as they near benefit exhaustion. An extension of benefits pushes UI
eligible unemployed workers further from their exhaustion point, which should reduce
search effort among unemployed workers. As with the effect of a benefit extension on
reservation wages, this effect should be more pronounced for workers who are already
near the end of their benefit eligibility or may have exhausted benefits prior to the
extension of benefits.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study employs the Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey (SUWNJ).
Sampled from the universe of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits as of Septem-
ber 28, 2009 in the state of New Jersey, the SUWNJ contains demographic and labor
market information about a group of over 6,000 workers. Weekly surveys were con-
ducted between October 2009 and April 2010 for 12 weeks, with an additional 12
weeks collected from workers who remained unemployed after the initial sample pe-
riod. In total, there are roughly 39,000 weekly interviews collected. I will restrict
the sample to working age respondents (20-65) who have yet to find a full-time job
and exclude extreme reservation wage and search effort responses4. This reduces the
4Specifically, I will exclude any weekly reservation wages above $8,000 or below $100, any hourly
reservation wages above $100 or below $5, and anyone who reports spending more than 80 hours
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sample to just over 25,600 observations and roughly 4,800 unique respondents.
The majority of reservation wage observations are reported as an annual salary
or as an hourly wage. Among the respondents who report reservation wages in the
same units throughout the survey, over half reported annual salaries and another 44%
reported hourly wages. As shown in Table 3.1, once converted to the equivalent of an
annual salary, reservation wages reported as weekly and hourly wages are substan-
tially lower. Across all reservation wage observations, the reported annual-equivalent
reservation wage is about $50,0005
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Reported Reservation Wages
Mean Observations Respondents
Reported reservation wages
Annual salary $61,210.03 13,618 2,229
Monthly salary $4,801.75 252 25
Weekly wage $709.96 1,156 177
Hourly wage $16.84 10,085 1,883
Converted to annual salary
Annual reported monthly $57,620.95
Annual reported weekly $36,917.98
Annual reported hourly $35,036.21
All converted to annual salary $49,543.86 25,111 4,314
Notes: Reservation wages are reported in each survey. Non-annual reservation wages are
converted in the following ways: reported monthly salaries are multiplied by 12; reported
weekly wages are multiplied by 52; reported hourly wages are multiplied by 2,080 (assuming
40/hour work weeks and 52 weeks worked per year).
Table 3.2 shows the annual-equivalent reservation wages for workers, separated
by different worker characteristics. Most of these relationships make intuitive sense.
Older workers set higher reservation wages, as do the more highly educated, those with
higher 2008 household incomes, and those with higher home purchase prices. Given
gender differences in wages, it is also unsurprising to see men with higher reservation
searching in a week. The elimination of surveys completed after a worker has accepted a new job
eliminates the largest portion of observations, dropping about 9,700 weekly surveys (about 25% of
the original sample). Other large groups of observations are dropped because of the age restriction
or the elimination of search effort outliers, about 5% of the original sample each.
5In Krueger and Mueller (2016), the authors have access to administrative data. They are able
to construct reservation wages as a ratio compared with their previous wage/salary. This study does
not have access to administrative data, so lacks data on when respondents leave UI and the size of
UI benefits received.
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wages. Similarly, given the erosion of human capital that comes with unemployment,
the fall of reservation wages with rising unemployment duration is predictable.
Having more in your savings account or less credit card debt is associated with
a higher reservation wage. This is likely correlated with 2008 household income, but
also fits in with the model presented in this paper. The model predicts that the
reservation wage is set equal to the value of remaining unemployed, which is higher
when unemployed workers have more savings and more credit to maintain their utility.
Those who exert more search effort also have higher reservation wages. Presumably,
these individuals feel as if they have more control over the arrival rate of their job
offers.
Measures of bias were calculated in Lindner (2018). Comparing those measures to
reported reservation wages shows that baseline pessimists, workers who overestimate
their unemployment spell, have higher average reservation wages. This is counter
to expectations, as we should expect to see optimists feeling more confident about
finding a job and therefore maintaining higher reservation wages. It should be noted,
however, that the mean reservation wage for optimists is still above the mean for the
entire sample, suggesting that those setting higher reservation wages are more likely to
respond to the questions about expectations. Conversely, control optimists, workers
who overestimate the return to their search effort, have higher average reservation
wages. If workers believe that more effort translates into more job offers, it follows
that they would have a higher reservation wage.
Search effort is reported in a number of ways. Respondents were asked to keep a
time diary as well as to summarize their job search activities over the past week. The
result is a set of information about the time spent searching, the methods used, and
the quantity of applications filed.6 Respondents spent an average of 14.7 hours per
week searching for a job, submitting nearly 6 applications each week. Most search
time was spent doing self-directed work, such as directly contacting employers, going
to interviews, or filling out applications.
6There is also information on the number of job offers received, restrictions that job searchers
faced, and training programs attended. I will focus on hours spent searching.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Reported Reservation Wages by Characteristic
Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Entire sample $49,543.86 25,111 Marital status
Age Single $41,590.15 5,970
20-24 $27,118.14 815 Married $55,038.70 13,387
25-29 $35,489.29 1,800 Separated $44,500.02 694
30-34 $43,910.02 2,130 Divorced $46,234.10 3,321
35-39 $47,101.40 2,136 Widowed $39,558.56 542
40-44 $49,472.90 2,868 Domestic partnership $44,444.61 1,183
45-49 $53,227.42 3,532 Unemployment duration
50-54 $53,262.43 4,260 Less than 10 weeks $51,591.26 1,377
55-59 $54,245.78 4,384 10-19 weeks $54,942.60 1,990
60-64 $53,163.25 3,186 20-29 weeks $55,630.84 2,413
Education 30-39 weeks $55,908.58 2,403
Some high school $30,376.27 447 40-49 weeks $51,445.55 2,494
High school $34,803.05 3,872 50-59 weeks $48,742.60 2,126
Some college $40,903.56 7,759 60-69 weeks $47,165.98 2,093
College $55,104.73 7,524 70-79 weeks $47,047.71 3,313
Some graduate school $59,358.11 1,922 80-89 weeks $45,348.16 4,069
Graduate school $69,672.59 3,579 90-99 weeks $44,614.72 2,220
Number of children 100 or more weeks $40,860.98 613
0 $46,848.24 7,892 Credit card debt at time of entry survey
1 $47,357.52 4,782 Less than $1,000 $55,367.45 6,407
2 $52,885.77 7,601 $1,000-$2,499 $52,933.49 2,800
3 $52,926.54 2,992 $2,500-$9,999 $50,401.01 3,756
4 $47,693.84 854 $10,000-$19,999 $54,451.20 2,261
5 $53,625.95 346 $20,000 or more $58,530.60 2,333
2008 Household income Savings at time of entry survey
Less than $10,000 $27,184.59 1,035 Less than $10,000 $44,326.69 7,959
$10,000-$19,999 $30,951.75 1,644 $10,000-$24,999 $54,613.20 2,248
$20,000-$29,999 $35,169.06 2,433 $25,000-$49,999 $61,501.58 1,532
$30,000-$39,999 $37,578.10 2,300 $50,000-$99,999 $66,509.36 1,344
$40,000-$49,999 $39,813.30 2,329 $100,000 or more $77,951.09 2,179
$50,000-$59,999 $42,521.72 1,891 Spousal work status
$60,000-$69,999 $48,047.67 1,588 Spouse works $53,700.01 10,819
$70,000-$79,999 $50,542.36 1,630 Spouse does not work $56,185.46 3,604
$80,000-$89,999 $50,902.57 1,555 Baseline bias
$90,000-$99,999 $50,436.18 1,605 Baseline optimists $58,687.92 6,963
$100,000-$149,999 $60,154.52 3,863 Baseline pessimists $66,016.91 343
$150,000+ $91,002.50 2,701 Control bias
Home purchase price Control optimists $63,374.71 3,233
Less than $25,000 $42,312.21 341 Control pessimists $56,580,84 3,855
$25,000-$49,999 $39,836.19 768 Weekly search hours
$50,000-$74,999 $47,479.13 899 Less than 5 hours $43,685.30 8,268
$75,000-$99,999 $52,415.51 1,142 5-9 hours $46,840.85 4,723
$100,000-$149,999 $50,708.46 2,291 10-14 hours $50,424.67 2,986
$150,000-$199,999 $52,391.53 2,141 15-19 hours $51,645.78 2,139
$200,000-$299,999 $55,739.23 3,008 20-24 hours $53,385.59 1,647
$300,000-$399,999 $61,006.92 1,713 25-29 hours $57,676.25 1,195
$400,000-$499,999 $71,362.44 721 30-34 hours $56,889.66 996
$500,000-$599,999 $80,973.49 332 35-39 hours $58,477.97 760
$600,000 or more $93,280.25 478 40 or more hours $59,525.93 2,397
Gender
Male $56,965.68 11,736
Female $43,031.54 13,375
Notes: Reservation wages are reported in each survey. Non-annual reservation wages are
converted in the following ways: reported monthly salaries are multiplied by 12; reported
weekly wages are multiplied by 52; reported hourly wages are multiplied by 2,080 (assuming
40/hour work weeks and 52 weeks worked per year).
Table 3.4 provides results of search effort by demographic characteristic. Hours
spent searching follows a hump-shaped pattern over age, suggesting that prime-age
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics on Job Search
Obs. Mean
Total hours searched in past 7 days 25,607 14.7
Hours of self-directed search 12.4
Directly contact employer 6,755 0.8
Contact friends/relatives 9,349 1.2
Attend job training 1,814 0.8
Answering ads 10,509 2.0
Attend interviews 3,541 0.4
Send resumes/applications 15,408 3.3
Look through ads 16,760 3.9
Hours of aided search 1.2
Employment agency 6,664 0.8
University employment center 1,563 0.1
Union register 2,200 0.3
Applications submitted in past 7 days 19,378 5.9
Notes: Total hours searched and number of applications submitted are reported
as summary values by respondents at the end of every seven day period. This
can be split into self-directed search and aided search. Self-directed search in-
cludes contacting employers directly, contacting friends or relatives, attending
job training, placing or answering ads, going to interviews, sending resumes,
filling out applications, or looking at ads. Aided search includes contacting pub-
lic or private employment agencies, contacting university employment centers or
checking a union register. The remaining search hours not categorized fell into
an ‘other’ category.
workers are working harder to regain employment. This is also true for men and
respondents whose spouses do not work, potentially increasing the urgency to leave
unemployment when needing to support a family as a sole breadwinner. Financial
constraints may also press respondents to search more intensively. Those with more
credit card debt spend more time searching, as well as those with lower levels of
savings.
Higher levels of search effort are correlated with being more highly educated.
Other variables correlated with education, such as home purchase price and household
income (and, in turn, reservation wages) show the same increases in search effort at
higher levels of income.
As described in Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama et al. (2014), search effort initially
increases over unemployment duration before falling at longer durations. Workers
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likely increase search effort as they grow eager to find a job, only to decrease search
effort as they become discouraged. Potter (2018) identifies the drop in search effort
that occurs through prolonged periods of bad news. There is no clear pattern across
the two measures of bias measured in Lindner (2018). The expectation is for search
effort to vary over the measure of control bias, which is defined based upon the return
to search effort, but the theoretical prediction about whether optimists should search
more or less is ambiguous due to competing incentives. The search effort reported
here does not shed light on the matter.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the average reported reservation wage and search effort
for each day around the November 6, 2009 extension announcement. A local poly-
nomial is fit to the set of reservation wages and search hours reported. Figure 3.1
illustrates a steady increase in average reservation wages following the announcement
date. While the graph does not clearly show a discrete jump in average reserva-
tion wages, it appears as if there are higher average reservation wages in the periods
that follow the extension. Similarly, Figure 3.2 shows steady declines in search hours
following the extension of UI benefits.
4 Empirical Approach
There were a series of UI benefits extensions during the Great Recession. Beyond
the standard, state-funded 26 weeks of unemployment insurance, a federally-funded
increase was added in June 2008 as support for workers given the rising unemploy-
ment rate and worsening labor market. Emergency Unemployment Compensation
2008 (EUC08) allowed for workers unemployed in May 2006 or after to move through
a tiered system of extra unemployment benefits after their state-funded UI was ex-
hausted. As the recession worsened, the EUC08 was modified on several occasions to
either provide more benefits or reduce the eligibility requirements.
This paper will exploit the presence of the November 6, 2009 EUC08 extension
within the SUWNJ sample period7. As reported by Nakajima (2012), this particular
7I will use the exact date of the extension in the analysis, but an additional robustness check could
utilize other dates. For example, while President Obama signed the extension on November 6, the
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Reported Search Hours by Characteristic
Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Entire sample 14.7 25,607 Marital status
Age Single 13.6 6,105
20-24 10.4 831 Married 14.2 13,656
25-29 12.4 1,841 Separated 14.8 721
30-34 12.6 2,208 Divorced 18.3 3,369
35-39 13.4 2,172 Widowed 16.8 548
40-44 14.8 2,906 Domestic partnership 15.4 1,190
45-49 16.4 3,592 Unemployment duration
50-54 17.0 4,388 Less than 10 weeks 14.6 1,404
55-59 15.5 4,440 10-19 weeks 13.8 2,033
60-64 13.4 3,229 20-29 weeks 15.2 2,475
Education 30-39 weeks 15.4 2,446
Some high school 11.1 452 40-49 weeks 15.8 2,520
High school 12.8 3,914 50-59 weeks 15.8 2,168
Some college 13.8 7,897 60-69 weeks 15.2 2,137
College 15.3 7,702 70-79 weeks 15.2 3,365
Some graduate school 15.7 1,942 80-89 weeks 14.0 4,165
Graduate school 17.4 3,690 90-99 weeks 12.8 2,272
Number of children 100 or more weeks 12.0 622
0 15.0 8,075 Credit card debt at time of entry survey
1 13.5 4,881 Less than $1,000 13.6 6,516
2 15.0 7,702 $1,000-$2,499 15.1 2,834
3 14.5 3,054 $2,500-$9,999 15.4 3,831
4 14.8 875 $10,000-$19,999 16.3 2,320
5 18.1 356 $20,000 or more 16.0 2,369
2008 Household income Savings at time of entry survey
Less than $10,000 11.8 1,047 Less than $10,000 14.2 8,077
$10,000-$19,999 13.5 1,675 $10,000-$24,999 15.1 2,278
$20,000-$29,999 14.6 2,482 $25,000-$49,999 15.7 1,555
$30,000-$39,999 13.8 2,341 $50,000-$99,999 14.1 1,355
$40,000-$49,999 15.8 2,360 $100,000 or more 14.1 2,198
$50,000-$59,999 13.9 1,922 Spousal work status
$60,000-$69,999 14.1 1,616 Spouse works 13.7 10,993
$70,000-$79,999 13.8 1,650 Spouse does not work 16.0 3,698
$80,000-$89,999 14.3 1,595 Baseline bias
$90,000-$99,999 14.7 1,621 Baseline optimists 14.4 7,000
$100,000-$149,999 15.1 3,940 Baseline pessimists 14.1 348
$150,000+ 17.9 2,749 Control bias
Home purchase price Control optimists 14.5 3,252
Less than $25,000 11.8 341 Control pessimists 14.6 3,874
$25,000-$49,999 11.6 782 Annual reservation wage
$50,000-$74,999 12.1 903 Less than $20k 11.3 1,107
$75,000-$99,999 12.7 1,152 $20k - $30k 12.3 4,316
$100,000-$149,999 14.3 2,335 $30k - $40k 13.0 5,645
$150,000-$199,999 14.9 2,180 $40k - $50k 14.4 4,138
$200,000-$299,999 14.5 3,048 $50k - $60k 15.6 3,261
$300,000-$399,999 15.7 1,744 $60k - $70k 15.9 1,860
$400,000-$499,999 15.6 737 $70k - $80k 16.7 1,372
$500,000-$599,999 18.5 351 $80k - $90k 17.7 1,090
$600,000 or more 21.7 482 $90k - $100k 21.8 612
Gender $100k - $150k 20.3 1,287
Male 16.3 11,915 $150k or more 24.8 423
Female 13.3 13,692
Notes: Search effort hours reported in each survey.
extension was significant. As part of this extension, Tiers 3 and 4 of EUC08 program
legislation was passed by Congress the previous afternoon. Also, as noted in Krueger and Mueller
(2016), the law did not go into effect until November 8. As noted in Rogers (1998), anticipation of
UI extensions seems like a larger problem. However, the choice of November 6 is reinforced by the
additional shock of a worse-than-expected jobs report that morning.
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Figure 3.1: Average Daily Reservation Wages Around UI Extension
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Notes: Red line is a kernel-weighted local polynomial on the set of reservation wages. Time 0
represents the UI benefit extension date of November 6, 2009. Dots are the average reservation
wage for each date. Source: Office of Population Research at Princeton University and author’s
calculations.
Figure 3.2: Average Daily Search Effort Around UI Extension
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Notes: Red line is a kernel-weighted local polynomial on the set of search effort responses. Time 0
represents the UI benefit extension date of November 6, 2009. Dots are the average search effort for
each date. Source: Office of Population Research at Princeton University and author’s calculations.
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were enacted. Including a minor modification to Tier 2, this provided a total of 20
more weeks of unemployment benefits8. For most workers in New Jersey, this allowed
for a total of 99 weeks of unemployment insurance.
The 20-week extension of UI benefits represents a discrete jump in the benefit
period T . According to the model presented in section 2, this change should lead to
a discrete jump in the value function for an unemployed worker and lead to higher
reservation wages. Similarly, the longer benefit period and increased value of unem-
ployment reduces the benefit to search and should result in lower search effort.
In order to address the question of whether UI extensions influence the reservation
wages set or search effort exerted by workers, this paper employs several techniques
that utilize the longitudinal nature of the SUWNJ. In the first part, a set of hypothesis
tests are conducted to evaluate whether there are significant changes to the mean
reservation wage or search effort following the UI extension date. In addition, since
the majority of observations appear after the extension occurs, a modified event study
analysis, where the baseline measure for the variable will be estimated using post-
event data, is employed.
4.1 Means Tests
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate that reservation wages rise and search effort falls near
the November 6 extension. These tests provide a formal way to examine whether
there are significant absolute changes in these two variables of interest.
In the first set of results, I identify the last survey before the extension and the
first survey after the extension completed by each respondent. For reservation wages,
as illustrated in Figure 3.3, the post-extension observation can fall anywhere after
November 6. This is because the reservation wage is a forward-looking response. On
average the last survey before the extension was completed 7.5 days before November
6, while the first survey after the extension was completed within 14.5 days. However,
search effort is reported as the number of hours spent looking for a job over the past
7 days. Because of this timing issue, the post-estimation search effort observation is
8The expansion of benefits was one extra week in Tier 2, 13 in Tier 3, and six in Tier 4
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the first survey completed after November 13. This means the first survey completed
after the extension occurs over 20 days after November 6, while the last pre-extension
survey occurs 7 days before.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of Paired Sample Means Test
61 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
November 2009
Reservation Wage
Search effort
Notes: The goal is to match the last observation for a respondent before the UI extension with the first
observation from the same respondent following the UI extension. Reservation wages are reported in
real-time, so there is no need to compare pre- and post-reservation wages with a lag. Search effort
is a recall question over the past 7 days, so the post-window is shifted to avoid overlap with the
extension date.
Given the varying and low response rates, as well as the weekly frequency, I also
run tests for independent before and after samples when studying windows close to
the extension date. By doing this, I am implicitly assuming that the respondents
in the pre-event window are not the same as the respondents in the post-event win-
dow. Figure 3.4 illustrates the technique, using a 5-day window before and after the
extension as an example. The average over all respondents who completed a survey
within the pre-extension window is compared with the average over all respondents
who completed a survey within the post-extension window. As in the paired exercise,
the post-extension window for search effort begins after November 13 when search
effort data do not contain the November 6 announcement date. As the event window
get larger, the sample size grows.
4.2 Event Study Analysis
This exercise is based on the event study analysis presented in Kothari and Warner
(2007), which is largely rooted in the corporate finance literature. Typically, event
studies are used to analyze the effect of an event such as a stock split on the stock
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of Independent Sample Means Test (5-day window)
61 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
November 2009
Reservation Wage
Search effort
Notes: Windows are symmetric on either side of the event. The variable or interest is averaged
within the window for each window size. Reservation wages are reported in real-time, so windows
are immediately before or after November 6. Search effort is a recall question over the past 7 days,
so the post-window gets shifted to avoid overlap with the extension date.
returns for a company. In this case, the UI extension on November 6 serves as the
event.
In a standard event study analysis, a large pre-event period is used to estimate
some version of a normal trend in the variable of interest for each respondent. Then,
for each respondent, it is possible to calculate error terms in the post-event window.
These errors are referred to as ‘abnormal’ variations in the variable of interest, and
provide a relative measure of whether reservation wages have increased or search effort
has declined. An alternative way to evaluate these outcomes is to sum the errors over
a period following the event to see if there are cumulative misses. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.5 for reservation wages. The abnormal reservation wage is the vertical
line just after the event date, showing the gap between the reported reservation wage
and the reservation wage predicted by the pre-event period trend. The shaded gray
area shows the cumulative abnormal responses above trend.
However, there are not enough observations in the SUWNJ before November 6
for each respondent to form a pre-event trend. Instead, this paper modifies the
approach by estimating a trend in the post-extension period. Taking advantage of
the longer post-extension sample period, I estimate a trend for reservation wages
and search effort after the extension that can be used to evaluate whether the pre-
extension outcomes were significantly different from trend. The modified approach is
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also presented in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Illustration of Event Study Adjustment
Standard Event StudyRes.
Wage
Time
Adjusted Event StudyRes.
Wage
Time
Notes: In the standard approach, a trend level of the variable of interest is estimated in a pre-event
period. Abnormal responses of the variable can be calculated by taking the difference between the
normal expectation and the true outcome (vertical line) or by summing all of these errors over a
post-event window (shaded gray area). There are not enough pre-event observations in the SUWNJ
to find a trend, so this study finds a post-event trend and calculates differences between normal
expectations and true outcomes in the pre-event period.
After trimming the original sample to 4,813 respondents, only 1,956 report at least
three reservation wages and 1,841 report at least three search effort observations over
the post-extension period. To form a simple linear estimate relating reservation wages
or search effort to unemployment duration for an individual, a meaningful gradient
would need at least 10 observations. There are just 385 respondents with at least
10 reservation wage observations and 375 respondents with at least 10 search effort
observations in the post-extension period.
One concern is that the group of individuals with ten or more reported reservation
wages are systematically different from the rest of the survey sample. Table 3.5
shows the descriptive statistics for survey respondents depending upon how many
reservation wage or search effort observations they reported. On average, the group
of survey-weighted respondents with enough reservation wage observations for a linear
prediction (10 or more) entered the survey 40 weeks further into their unemployment
spell. They are more likely to be female, but less likely to be black or Hispanic.
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On average, they are also older and more highly educated. The weighted samples
with 3 or more reservation wage or search effort observations, besides being more
educated, are much closer to the entire weighted sample. Moving forward, given the
lack of representativeness among respondents with 10 or more observations in the
post-extension window, I perform the analysis using both subsamples.
In completing the analysis, I run respondent-level regressions of reservation wages
and search on unemployment duration, without controls. Using the results of indi-
vidual linear regressions, I form predictions of reservation wages and search effort for
each observation. I then create a measure of abnormal reservation wages or search
effort by taking the difference between survey response and predicted values. For
each group, I also calculate cumulative abnormal differences over different windows -
14, 21 and 24 days9.
These results of the individual-level trend regressions are summarized in Table
3.6. For the reservation wage responses, there are large masses of respondents that
always report the same reservation wage. After removing those respondents, trends
for reservation wages among those with three or more responses appear to be rela-
tively flat. Trends slope downward more sharply among respondents with 10 or more
reservation wage observations, which matches what would be expected among longer-
term unemployed workers. For search effort, there are clear downward trends over
unemployment duration. This confirms previous findings in the literature.
5 Results
The paired reservation wage test of means relies on over 3,200 respondents. A dif-
ference is taken between the first reservation wage reported after the UI extension
and the last reservation wage reported before the UI extension. Using the set of dif-
ferences, a one-sided t-test is conducting to see if the difference in means is positive.
Recall, the model in section 2 showed that reservation wages should rise in response
to an increase in benefit duration. Results in Table 3.7 show that reservation wages
9I could calculate cumulative returns for shorter windows, but I need to calculate a standard
deviation over a longer window in order to have enough observations.
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Table 3.6: Summary of Trend Regressions
At least 2 different Significant trend
Total Total Pos. Neg. Total Pos. Neg.
3 or more reservation wages reported
Count 1,956 1,058 512 546 200 76 124
Percent of total 48.4% 51.6% 38.0% 62.0%
10 or more reservation wages reported
Count 385 239 107 132 91 30 61
Percent of total 44.8% 55.2% 33.0% 67.0%
3 or more search effort obs. reported
Count 1,841 1,770 627 1,143 263 65 198
Percent of total 35.4% 64.6% 24.7% 75.3%
10 or more search effort obs. reported
Count 375 367 136 231 111 33 78
Percent of total 37.1% 62.9% 29.7% 70.3%
Notes: Normal reservation wages and search effort are predicted using results from
a linear regression of reservation wages or search effort on unemployment duration
for each individual, where linear regression is separately estimated for the sample
of individuals with 3 or more observations or 10 or more observations. Reported
are the number and fractions of respondents with positive or negative slope coeffi-
cients. A smaller subset is reported for the respondents with slope coefficients that
are significantly different from zero.
actually dropped among the paired sample of respondents. This result is driven by
the drop among respondents reporting their reservation wage as an annual salary.
In fact, the entire sample and the group responding with annual salaries reported
statistically significant declines in their reservation wages at the 5 percent level. This
suggests that respondents may have taken the UI extension as a signal that labor
market conditions were worse than expected.
Table 3.8 reports the results of reservation wage means tests on subsets within the
sample. The decline in reservation wages is driven by men. They seem to be college-
educated, single and without children. There is also a correlation with financial
constraints, as those with higher home purchase prices, moderately high amounts of
credit card debt, and lower savings all reduce their reservation wage. The UI extension
may lower their threshold for accepting a new job. However, there also appears to
be a tipping point, as those with the highest amounts of credit card debt and home
prices increase their reservation wages. Presumably, these individuals have so many
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Table 3.7: Reservation Wage Means Test: Paired Sample, by Reservation Wage
Reporting Method
Mean Difference Observations
Reported reservation wages
Annual salary -$1,175** 1,711
Monthly salary $1,791.30 23
Weekly wage -$3,882.88* 125
Hourly wage $106.47 1,319
All respondents -$730.34** 3,208
Notes: The event date is taken as November 6, 2009, the extension of
UI benefits. Each row shows the mean difference in reservation wages
reported by the same respondent in their last survey before and first
survey after the extension. One-sided t-tests are computed to test
whether the mean reservation wage is different before and after the UI
extension. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
financial obligations that they cannot afford to accept a low paying job.
Interestingly, reservation wages fall for the group of workers who were unemployed
between 80-89 weeks upon entering the survey. This group, if they had been fully
eligible for all previous UI extensions, would have just exhausted their benefits when
the survey started. Even though they were just provided benefits and had the value of
remaining unemployed increased dramatically, they lowered their reservation wages.
More in line with the theoretical prediction, the group of workers who had been
unemployed for over 100 weeks did dramatically increase their reservation wage after
being given 20 extra weeks of unemployment benefits.
The search effort means tests of paired respondents are reported in Table 3.9. One-
sided t-tests are conducted to test whether the difference in means is negative. Among
the 2,539 respondents, the average decline in search effort was one hour per week.
This matches the expected outcome from the theoretical model, and is consistent
over sex, marital status and unemployment duration. The effect is strongest for more
highly educated prime age workers who have working spouses and lower reservation
wages.
In the means-test analysis that relies on the assumption of independent samples
before and after the UI extension, the event window size can vary. For each window
size, a one-sided t-test evaluates whether the mean reservation wage after the UI
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Table 3.8: Reservation Wage Means Test: Paired Sample, by Characteristic
Mean Diff. Obs. Mean Diff. Obs.
Entire sample -$730.34** 3,208 Marital status
Age Single -$1,300.05* 782
20-24 $550.43* 117 Married -$711.24 1,674
25-29 -$563.03 256 Separated $50.69 104
30-34 -$338.30 297 Divorced -$564.60 419
35-39 -$1,021.63 312 Widowed $527.08 65
40-44 -$728.65 409 Domestic partnership $315.75 159
45-49 -$276.70 466 Unemployment duration (entry survey)
50-54 -$519.32 508 Less than 10 weeks $1,518.81 148
55-59 -$1,680.92* 497 10-19 weeks -$2,193.45* 314
60-64 -$918.40 346 20-29 weeks -$689.82 340
Education 30-39 weeks -$440.90 362
Some high school -$705.52 58 40-49 weeks -$845.10 361
High school -$446.67 508 50-59 weeks -$363.80 305
Some college $107.80 988 60-69 weeks -$908.10 236
College -$2,773.23*** 936 70-79 weeks $451.56 319
Some graduate school -$272.46 252 80-89 weeks -$2,844.36** 498
Graduate school $995.27* 464 90-99 weeks $782.29 256
Number of children 100 weeks or more $3,155.36*** 69
0 -$1,256.26** 955 Credit card debt at time of entry survey
1 -$749.54 605 Less than $1,000 -$735.38 749
2 -$284.02 997 $1,000-$2,499 -$1,750.88 361
3 $385.15 399 $2,500-$9,999 -$888.23 510
4 $1,252.14 117 $10,000-$19,999 -$2,692.57* 294
5 -$10,250.23 43 $20,000 or more $1,061.74* 299
2008 Household income Savings at time of entry survey
Less than $10,000 -$409.88 145 Less than $10,000 -$898.19* 1,012
$10,000-$19,999 $427.18 215 $10,000-$24,999 -$163.16 294
$20,000-$29,999 -$759.00 325 $25,000-$49,999 -$195.63 192
$30,000-$39,999 $907.21 286 $50,000-$99,999 -$2,968.24 148
$40,000-$49,999 -$2,298.11* 301 $100,000 or more -$1,519.00** 241
$50,000-$59,999 -$1,552.85** 221 Spousal work status
$60,000-$69,999 $1,934.34 205 Spouse works -$785.08 1,377
$70,000-$79,999 -$661.75 208 Spouse does not work -$222.92 436
$80,000-$89,999 $46.98 195 Baseline bias
$90,000-$99,999 -$1,812.16 204 Baseline optimists -$538.94 815
$100,000-$149,999 -$1,662.57* 491 Baseline pessimists $114.42 43
$150,000+ -$1,252.26 354 Control bias
Home purchase price Control optimists -$782.79 414
Less than $25,000 -$20.00 38 Control pessimists -$343.77 419
$25,000-$49,999 $482.59 85 Weekly search hours (average)
$50,000-$74,999 $459.21 101 Less than 5 hours -$728.88 906
$75,000-$99,999 -$929.69 130 5-9 hours -$1,342.55 705
$100,000-$149,999 -$213.07 270 10-14 hours -$851.81 440
$150,000-$199,999 -$654.72 271 15-19 hours -$55.44 316
$200,000-$299,999 -$2.78 374 20-24 hours -$106.46 221
$300,000-$399,999 -$3,865.97** 211 25-29 hours -$811.02* 167
$400,000-$499,999 -$2,249.17* 96 30-34 hours -$1,805.21 140
$500,000-$599,999 -$7,557.33 45 35-39 hours $743.33 84
$600,000 or more $5,494.60** 63 40 or more hours $24.10 229
Gender
Male -$1,557.20*** 1,477
Female -$7.74 1,731
Notes: The event date is November 6, 2009, the extension of UI benefits. Each row shows
the mean difference in reservation wages reported by respondents in their last survey
before and first survey after the extension. T-tests are computed to test whether the
mean reservation wage is different before and after the UI extension. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.9: Search Effort Means Test: Paired Sample, by Characteristic
Mean Diff. Obs. Mean Diff. Obs.
Entire sample -1.00*** 2,539 Marital status
Age Single -1.87*** 608
20-24 -1.67 77 Married -0.87*** 1,340
25-29 -1.88** 188 Separated -1.81 77
30-34 -1.52** 231 Divorced -0.04 336
35-39 -2.40*** 238 Widowed -1.89 54
40-44 -1.49** 330 Domestic partnership 0.07 120
45-49 -1.12* 357 Unemployment duration (entry survey)
50-54 0.22 415 Less than 10 weeks 1.09 82
55-59 0.16 413 10-19 weeks -1.20* 241
60-64 -1.37** 290 20-29 weeks -1.90*** 267
Education 30-39 weeks -1.35** 292
Some high school -3.01* 50 40-49 weeks -0.52 282
High school -0.62 398 50-59 weeks -0.83 250
Some college -1.39*** 787 60-69 weeks -1.74** 186
College -1.16*** 747 70-79 weeks -0.38 258
Some graduate school 0.79 194 80-89 weeks -0.07 412
Graduate school -0.94* 362 90-99 weeks -2.63*** 219
Number of children 100 weeks or more -1.10 50
0 -1.13** 751 Credit card debt at time of entry survey
1 -0.92** 489 Less than $1,000 -0.92** 617
2 -0.85** 785 $1,000-$2,499 -0.99* 293
3 -2.24*** 311 $2,500-$9,999 -0.76 391
4 0.92 92 $10,000-$19,999 -1.12* 230
5 -2.78 35 $20,000 or more -1.12 223
2008 Household income Savings at time of entry survey
Less than $10,000 -1.35* 116 Less than $10,000 -0.51 794
$10,000-$19,999 -1.47 163 $10,000-$24,999 -1.11* 230
$20,000-$29,999 -0.79 252 $25,000-$49,999 0.68 157
$30,000-$39,999 -1.02 228 $50,000-$99,999 -1.43* 127
$40,000-$49,999 -2.08*** 231 $100,000 or more -0.62 186
$50,000-$59,999 -0.89 180 Spousal work status
$60,000-$69,999 -.41 158 Spouse works -1.13*** 1,076
$70,000-$79,999 -2.17*** 162 Spouse does not work -0.08 365
$80,000-$89,999 -1.13 163 Baseline bias
$90,000-$99,999 0.30 158 Baseline optimists -0.91** 699
$100,000-$149,999 -1.59*** 400 Baseline pessimists 0.21 37
$150,000+ 0.21 274 Control bias
Home purchase price Control optimists -0.93** 357
Less than $25,000 -1.32 28 Control pessimists -1.30** 360
$25,000-$49,999 -1.36 64 Reservation Wage (average)
$50,000-$74,999 -0.41 90 Less than $20k -0.28 112
$75,000-$99,999 -1.52 109 $20k-$30k -1.39** 437
$100,000-$149,999 -0.34 225 $30k-$40k -0.87* 560
$150,000-$199,999 -1.87*** 221 $40k-$50k -0.69 402
$200,000-$299,999 -1.58*** 292 $50k-$60k -1.63** 318
$300,000-$399,999 -0.11 162 $60k-$70k -1.15* 192
$400,000-$499,999 0.36 77 $70k-$80k -0.18 137
$500,000-$599,999 -4.04** 32 $80k-$90k -0.49 95
$600,000 or more -1.17 44 $90k-$100k 1.03 55
Gender $100k-$150k -0.84 131
Male -1.15*** 1,154 $150k or more -2.76 46
Female -0.87*** 1,385
Notes: The event date is November 6, 2009, the extension of UI benefits. Each row shows
the mean difference in total search hours reported by the same respondent in their last
survey before and first survey after the extension. T-tests are computed to test whether
the mean search effort is different before and after the UI extension. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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extension across respondents within the window is higher than the mean reservation
wage among respondents within an equal sized window prior to the extension. Table
3.10 reports the results for the t-tests for windows spanning from 1-24 days. Following
a period of adjustment, there is a strong increase in the average reservation wage.
Roughly one and a half weeks after the UI extension, reported reservation wages had
risen by $1,500-$2,500. Looking at these gains by worker characteristic, the rise is
reservation wages is driven by young, unmarried workers who are college educated. As
shown in Table 3.11, this is pattern is heavily influenced by the respondents reporting
hourly wages.
Table 3.10: Reservation Wage Means Test: Independent Sample
Days from Before Nov. 6 After Nov. 6
event date Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Difference
1 $53,110.72 32,986.02 293 $46,647.78 27,684.13 198 -$6,462.94***
2 $50,329.05 33,621.36 588 $50,059.56 36,471.37 307 -$269.49
3 $50,501.60 34,518.29 1,189 $51,004.96 36,644.97 417 $503.36
4 $50,505.92 34,176.48 1,355 $50,712.83 33,476.19 939 $206.91
5 $50,180.98 33,486.65 1,493 $50,627.32 33,080.07 1,211 $446.34
6 $50,424.85 34,839.82 1,712 $50,510.03 32,017.12 1,490 $85.18
7 $50,898.13 35,020.13 2,082 $51,542.08 34,510.69 1,807 $643.95
8 $50,880.47 35,407.31 2,386 $51,289.52 34,398.37 2,009 $409.05
9 $50,217.82 34,362.60 2,771 $50,994.52 34,066.78 2,116 $776.71
10 $49,958.95 34,014.22 3,461 $51,149.98 34,019.89 2,255 $1,191.03*
11 $49,810.51 34,215.25 3,780 $51,328.40 33,635.55 2,682 $1,517.89**
12 $49,898.74 34,634.51 3,932 $51,289.69 33,433.98 2,943 $1,390.95**
13 $49,861.65 34,471.43 4,241 $51,124.60 32,968.75 3,166 $1,262.94*
14 $49,861.90 34,209.92 4,670 $51,305.38 33,369.79 3,450 $1,443.48**
15 $50,035.56 34,455.22 5,072 $51,429.45 33,830.75 3,609 $1,393.89**
16 $49,761.08 34,112.22 5,467 $51,387.02 33,862.45 3,699 $1,625.94**
17 $49,529.13 34,077.35 6,007 $51,353.10 33,830.44 3,805 $1,823.97***
18 $49,073.77 33,712.96 6,453 $51,520.24 34,051.98 4,179 $2,446.47***
19 $49,076.83 33,725.35 6,708 $51,446.21 33,860.22 4,396 $2,369.37***
20 $49,006.50 33,751.65 7,141 $51,431.54 33,685.48 4,498 $2,425.05***
21 $49,104.94 33,448.06 7,653 $51,487.52 33,794.42 4,758 $2,382.58***
22 $49,206.48 33,176.62 8,014 $51,319.61 33,570.42 4,954 $2,113.14***
23 $49,318.99 33,242.37 8,307 $51,373.26 33,560.03 5,085 $2,054.27***
24 $49,407.51 33,240.88 8,599 $51,375.56 33,466.11 5,223 $1,968.05***
Notes: The event date is November 6, 2009, the extension of UI benefits. Each row
shows the mean reservation wage reported within the specified window before and after
November 6. T-tests are computed to test whether the mean reservation wage is different
before and after the UI extension, assuming the responses before and after the extension
are independent and the two samples have different variances (as evidenced by the different
standard deviations). Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The search effort results in Table 3.12 show outcomes from one-sided t-tests eval-
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Table 3.11: Reservation Wage Means Test: Independent Sample, by Reservation
Wage Reporting Method
Days from Full Reported Reservation Wages Frequency
event date Sample Annual Monthly Weekly Hourly
1 -$6,462.94*** -$8,159.11** -$8,710.00** $1,505.02
2 -$269.49 -$615.46 -$11,700.00 -$3,298.45 $1,523.41
3 $503.36 $1,331.21 $24,120.00 -$2,857.94 $505.05
4 $206.91 -$539.53 -$2,909.09 -$2,065.07 $725.68
5 $446.34 -$31.21 -$9,243.96 $391.36 $510.06
6 $85.18 -$888.49 -$2,500.00 $808.22 $501.88
7 $643.95 $360.42 -$2,940.00 -$1,179.29 $980.82
8 $409.05 -$297.21 -$1,400.00 -$415.73 $1,260.39*
9 $776.71 -$160.67 $1,104.35 $602.71 $1,344.53*
10 $1,191.03* $434.77 $4,814.12 $1,617.87 $1,464.12**
11 $1,517.89** $351.10 $7,031.66 $1,419.08 $1,692.58**
12 $1,390.95** $334.27 -$4,263.16 $2,274.60 $1,511.96**
13 $1,262.94* $316.61 -$5,809.76 $491.75 $1,284.23**
14 $1,443.48** $808.15 -$6,507.94 -$267.90 $1,217.33**
15 $1,393.89** $572.19 -$1,322.22 $148.33 $1,376.97**
16 $1,625.94** $658.84 -$893.63 $101.83 $1,626.45***
17 $1,823.97*** $863.72 $90.00 $1,502.92 $1,866.88***
18 $2,446.47*** $1,360.70* $2,167.62 $1,032.22 $2,058.77***
19 $2,369.37*** $1,185.29 -$338.31 $1,205.04 $2,021.69***
20 $2,425.05*** $1,347.39* -$4,997.75 $923.88 $2,100.37***
21 $2,382.58*** $1,340.25* -$4,892.31 $305.47 $2,176.34***
22 $2,113.14*** $1,187.61* -$2,953.85 -$202.46 $1,924.03***
23 $2,054.27*** $1,058.26 -$2,420.02 -$490.19 $1,998.61***
24 $1,968.05*** $1,003.20 -$906.10 -$385.00 $1,967.43***
Notes: The event date is November 6, 2009, the extension of UI benefits. Each row shows
the difference in mean reservation wages reported within the specified window before and
after November 6. T-tests are computed to test whether the mean reservation wage is
different before and after the UI extension, assuming the responses before and after the
extension are independent and the two samples have different variances (as evidenced by
the different standard deviations). Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
uating whether the mean level of search effort is lower following the UI extension. As
in Table 3.10, the results are reported using a variety of event windows. Here, the
theoretical prediction is clearly matched, as search effort falls significantly following
the UI extension. Among different subsamples, this effect is most prevalent among
younger and married cohorts who are college educated. Workers who have been un-
employed for shorter periods of time and with more savings reported larger reductions
in search effort, as well.
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A major finding in Lindner (2018) was that workers who overestimated the mar-
ginal return to search effort ultimately spent more time searching for a job. In this
hypothesis testing framework, this result is reinforced. Workers who underestimate
the marginal return to search effort respond more strongly to the UI extension, per-
haps because they started at a higher level of search effort.
Table 3.12: Search Effort Means Test: Independent Sample
Days from Before Nov. 6 After Nov. 6
event date Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Difference
1 15.63 15.44 298 14.32 15.43 203 -1.30
2 15.93 15.56 604 14.46 15.41 312 -1.47*
3 16.51 16.09 1,214 14.83 15.25 455 -1.68**
4 16.53 16.15 1,383 15.52 15.91 886 -1.01*
5 16.49 16.19 1,521 15.86 16.19 1,150 -0.63
6 16.35 16.04 1,743 15.83 16.26 1,375 -0.52
7 16.41 16.07 2,116 15.59 16.03 1,660 -0.83*
8 16.52 16.07 2,425 15.63 16.07 1,820 -0.89**
9 16.46 16.07 2,818 15.56 16.04 1,911 -0.89**
10 16.47 16.05 3,514 15.39 15.94 2,020 -1.09***
11 16.45 16.07 3,840 15.46 16.03 2,399 -0.99***
12 16.40 16.04 3,994 15.49 16.00 2,617 -0.91**
13 16.42 16.06 4,311 15.37 15.99 2,723 -1.04***
14 16.40 16.12 4,745 15.37 16.07 2,986 -1.03***
15 16.37 16.05 5,152 15.22 15.92 3,184 -1.15***
16 16.37 16.08 5,555 15.18 15.90 3,319 -1.19***
17 16.31 16.01 6,100 15.15 15.87 3,464 -1.16***
18 16.28 16.02 6,558 15.04 15.90 3,821 -1.24***
19 16.30 16.04 6,819 15.07 15.90 4,045 -1.23***
20 16.28 15.99 7,261 15.06 15.91 4,203 -1.23***
21 16.29 15.92 7,786 15.04 15.87 4,420 -1.26***
22 16.38 15.95 8,153 15.01 15.85 4,573 -1.37***
23 16.47 16.04 8,450 14.98 15.82 4,657 -1.50***
24 16.51 16.08 8,748 14.95 15.83 4,739 -1.56***
Notes: The event date is November 6, 2009, the extension of UI benefits. Each
row shows the mean search hours reported within the specified window before
and after November 6. T-tests are computed to test whether the mean search
effort is different before and after the UI extension, assuming the responses
before and after the extension are independent and the two samples have different
variances (as evidenced by the different standard deviations). Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In periods over one week removed from the UI extension, the independent sam-
ple means tests show that reservation wages and search effort both responded in
92
accordance with economic theory. As a robustness check, the event study analysis
will account for the trend in reservation wages and search effort for each individual.
Previous research has shown, for example, that search effort generally falls over an
unemployment spell. Using the means test establishes that search effort has fallen
in absolute terms. Incorporating the event study approach allows an evaluation of
whether search effort, in response to the UI extension, has fallen more than expected.
The first step is to look at the individual-level abnormal reservation wages and
search effort to see if any particular individuals have responded to the benefit ex-
tension. Within the different window lengths, I can find the individual’s standard
deviation of their abnormal outcomes10. Using these standard deviations, I can cal-
culate a t-statistic to test how many individuals have statistically significant abnormal
cumulative reservation wages or search effort. This corresponds to the gray areas in
Figure 3.5.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3.13. The theoretical prediction
is that the extension of UI benefits should lead to higher reservation wages, through
the increased present discounted value of staying unemployed. Given the structure of
this analysis, with the event period occurring before the UI extension, this would be
negative deviations from the post-extension trend. In each size of event window, a
larger fraction of workers have negative shocks to their reservation wages than positive
shocks when the trend is estimated using 3 observations as a minimum. However,
the fraction of those with significantly increased and decreased reservation wages are
nearly equal11. For search effort, the theoretical prediction is for search hours to fall
after the extension. Therefore, positive cumulative abnormal search effort fits with
the theoretical prediction. That does not appear to be the case here.
A second way to analyze the event study results is to look at the cross-sectional
averages. Table 3.14 reports the average cumulative abnormal reservation wages and
search for different event window sizes. As described for individuals, because of the
10Here, I only use the 14, 21 and 24 day window lengths because I need enough observations
within the window (minimum of 3) to calculate the standard deviation.
11This lends credence to an interpretation among some workers that extended UI benefits indicates
a much weaker labor market, and therefore they should lower their reservation wage so as to escape
unemployment more quickly. It is a form of learning.
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Table 3.13: Cumulative Abnormal Outcomes, Within Respondent
Window Size
14 Days 21 Days 24 Days
Pct. of Pct. of Pct. of
Count Total Count Total Count Total
Normal res. wage predicted with 3 obs. or more
Positive abnormal cum. res. wage 10 11.2% 64 10.6% 69 9.2%
Negative abnormal cum. res. wage 12 13.5% 74 12.2% 75 10.0%
Total 89 606 752
Normal res. wage predicted with 10 obs. or more
Positive abnormal cum. res. wage 3 20.0% 24 16.9% 23 13.7%
Negative abnormal cum. res. wage 3 20.0% 22 15.5% 23 13.7%
Total 15 142 168
Normal effort predicted with 3 obs. or more
Positive abnormal cum. effort 15 11.0% 49 5.9% 58 5.9%
Negative abnormal cum. effort 23 16.9% 85 10.2% 93 9.4%
Total 136 835 985
Normal effort predicted with 10 obs. or more
Positive abnormal cum. effort 3 11.1% 6 3.2% 12 5.5%
Negative abnormal cum. effort 6 22.2% 15 8.0% 16 7.3%
Total 27 188 219
Notes: Normal reservation wages are predicted using results from a linear regression of
reservation wages on unemployment duration for each individual, where linear regression
is separately estimated for the sample of individuals with 3 or more reservation wage
observations or 10 or more reservation wage observations. In order to test for significance,
each respondent must have 3 or more reservation wage observations within the event
window, from either Oct. 14, Oct. 17, or Oct. 24 to Nov. 6.
modified technique, theory predicts negative reservation wage outcomes and posi-
tive search effort outcomes. The results show positive average cumulative abnormal
reservation wages, counter to the theoretical prediction, but most of them are not
significantly different from zero. Search effort results are much stronger among the
sample with 10 or more observations, clearly showing a large cumulative investment
in search effort prior to the UI extension.
Averaging in the cross-section, a slightly noisier approach is to test if the mean
abnormal reservation wage or search effort is significantly different from zero at dif-
ferent dates. The area of interest would be the dates leading up to the UI extension.
Figure 3.6 shows the average abnormal reservation wage for different trend estimation
samples. Generally, there is no consistent pattern of negative pre-extension reserva-
tion wages, as predicted by the model presented in this paper. Search effort results
are in Figure 3.7. In the right panel, the mean abnormal search effort prior to the
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Table 3.14: Cross-Sectional Cumulative Abnormal Outcomes
Event Window Size
3 Days 7 Days 14 Days 21 Days 24 Days
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Normal res. wage predicted with 3 obs. or more
Average value 622.93 742.08 1,138.01 1,304.66 1,196.73
P-value 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.24
Observations 1,164 1,494 1,729 1,828 1,852
Normal res. wage predicted with 10 obs. or more
Average value 730.92 271.78 1,120.83 974.98 969.99
P-value 0.61 0.83 0.50 0.58 0.58
Observations 248 310 350 367 375
Normal effort predicted with 3 obs. or more
Average value 0.69 0.23 0.33 0.03 0.09
P-value 0.06 0.57 0.60 0.97 0.93
Observations 1,112 1,413 1,628 1,720 1,741
Normal effort predicted with 10 obs. or more
Average value 2.08 1.99 3.56 4.60 4.55
P-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 248 309 343 360 367
Notes: Normal reservation wages and search effort are predicted using
results from a linear regression on unemployment duration for each
individual, where linear regressions are separately estimated for the
sample of individuals with 3 or more observations or 10 or more ob-
servations. All event windows span from between Oct. 14 and Nov. 3
to Nov. 6.
November 6 extension is well above zero for most of the period. This captures the
idea that there were drops in search effort after the UI extension beyond what would
be expected during an unemployment spell.
6 Conclusion
While there is great interest in studying the effects of unemployment insurance on the
duration of unemployment, few current papers study the underlying worker behavior
in response to the presence of UI. This paper takes a closer look at how UI benefits
change the incentive for workers to enjoy leisure or be selective in their labor market
outcomes. These both serve as inputs in determining unemployment duration.
This paper utilizes an extension in UI benefit duration to test how the reserva-
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Figure 3.6: Abnormal Reservation Wages Around UI Extension
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(b) 10 or more observations
Notes: Constructed using the sample of respondents who reported at least 3 or 10 reservation wages
in the post-extension survey period. Time 0 represents the UI benefit extension date of November
6, 2009. Each point is the average abnormal reservation wage for each date. Source: Office of
Population Research at Princeton University and author’s calculations.
Figure 3.7: Abnormal Search Effort Around UI Extension
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(b) 10 or more observations
Notes: Constructed using the sample of respondents who reported at least 3 or 10 search effort
observations in the post-extension survey period. Time 0 represents the UI benefit extension date of
November 6, 2009. Each point is the average abnormal search effort for each date. Source: Office
of Population Research at Princeton University and author’s calculations.
tion wage and search effort of workers change following a lengthening of potential UI
benefit duration. Even though economic theory predicts that more benefits should
increase reservation wages and decrease search effort, the results presented here sug-
gest that workers are more likely to adjust along the margin of search effort. One
possible explanation for these results could be related to the accuracy of the data.
Search effort is an easy value to report, as respondents can easily recall what they
have already done. Reservation wages, however, require foresight and can be dictated
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by outside financial obligations. Further work using self-reported reservation wages
may be useful in understanding what information is contained in this self-reported
value.
It may be the case that reservation wages did not significantly increase within
the survey respondents because UI extensions not only change the value of remain-
ing unemployed, but also provide a negative signal about the labor market. This
seems especially likely given the survey time period, which occurred during the Great
Recession. Offsetting the increase in reservation wages predicted by the consumption-
smoothing benefit of extended benefits could be a drop in reservation wages to increase
the arrival of job offers following the revelation that the labor market is in worse con-
dition than expected. In this sense, studying UI extensions could have additional
value compared with studies using, for example, variation in state-level UI rules.
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